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n each issue, Hemisphere attem pts to tackle critical issues affecting the Americas. In recent
years, our readers have requested m ore in-depth discussion o f a single topic from a variety of
viewpoints. In the last two issues, therefore, we have shifted our form at to include a central
core of articles about a specific topic. We have also attem pted to move the magazine toward a
m ore graphics intensive form at. I hope you find our new form at m ore appealing and o u r arti
cles inform ative and challenging.
In this issue we focus on neoliberalism or, as some may prefer to call it, m arket-oriented reforms.
T h ro u g h out Latin America and the Caribbean these reform s have entered into a critical second
phase. Neoliberalism 's harshest critics point to the exacerbation o f inequality and the spread of
poverty, crime and general social degradation. Supporters o f the reform s note the end of hyperinfla
tion, the restoration o f econom ic growth, and an increase in large-scale foreign direct investment.
We have invited a select group o f scholars and journalists to exam ine this debate by focusing on some
o f the central them es o f the neoliberal agenda, including administrative decentralization, privatiza
tion and free trade.
T he issue begins with com m entaries by journalists Howard LaFranchi and Andres O ppenheim er,
who re p o rt on the general econom ic and social impacts o f m arket reform in Latin America and the
left’s attem pt to form ulate an alternative to neoliberalism.
T he features section includes a special forum on privatization, a key tenet o f neoliberal reform .
T he three articles devoted to this topic address the course and outcom e of privatization in Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. Also in this section, photojournalist Jan e t Jarm an discusses attem pts to
regulate the environm ental im pact o f free trade along the US-Mexican border, and Allan Rosenbaum
traces efforts to strengthen local governm ent in different m unicipalities across Latin America.
Hemisphere’s reports section broadens the issue’s focus with articles relating to other topics of inter
est in the Americas. In this issue, George Grayson discusses the future prospects o f M exico’s ruling
party, and Gary Brana-Shute provides an account o f his experience as an elections observer in
Jam aica.
Photo essays have becom e an im portant part of Hemisphere. We believe that images have the power
to depict a certain p oint o f view, and tell a story that articles may not be able to convey in words. We
have published the works o f outstanding young photographers from around the Americas, and in this
issue we are delighted to share with you Ricardo F unari’s dram atic photo essay on labor exploitation
in rural Brazil. His depiction o f workers in the sugar, ru b b er and charcoal industries points to the
harsh realities of life in contem porary Latin America.
Finally, I would like to introduce our new m anaging editor, Alisa Newman. Alisa holds an MA in
Latin Am erican history from the University of Texas-Austin and has editorial experience with a variety
o f publications.
For the past decade, Hemisphere's objective has been to prom ote an intelligent debate on a broad
range of issues affecting the Americas. We urge you to write and share with us your views on the mag
azine and specific articles in this and previous issues.
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Staying t he Course
H ow ard LaFranchi

uring a Buenos Aires
am ong these the toppling of infla
protest m arch last year
tion. At the same time, however,
against President
reform program s have been less suc
Carlos M enem ’s
cessful at improving econom ic and
neoliberal economic
social conditions for a wider spec
program , the usual
trum of the population. Critics
jeers and cries were suddenly charge
rivaled that while the m acroeconom 
by a new chant. “Bucaram!
ic indicators achieved by neoliberal
Bucaram!”the crowd howled in uni
adm inistrations are often impressive,
son.
the gains have not trickled down to
Far from a cry of support for
those who need them most.
E cuador’s deposed president, the
Latin Americans will not soon for
crowd’s chant referred to Bucaram ’s
get the years when inflation in some
fate after im plem enting stringent
countries reached an annual rate of
neoliberal economic reforms. As
1,000%. Tales abound o f the
such, it was a warning to A rgentina’s
Argentine or Brazilian housewife
leaders that the same end could
who, one m orning in the 1980s,
befall them if they persist on the
decided to bake a cake. According
same course. M enem got a rude
to these stories, she went to the store
shock after the Congressional elec
to purchase eggs for the batter, got
tions of O ctober 1997, when the lefthom e, and decided she needed
of-center Alianza party gained con
m ore eggs. She then returned to
trol of the legislature after a cam
the store with the am ount of money
paign that criticized the president’s
paid for the eggs 20 m inutes earlier,
econom ic policy and its effect on
only to find they had doubled in
average Argentines. This policy
price. Such tales are legion and leg
am ounts to a fairly classic package of
endary.
neoliberal econom ic reforms: curb
In 1996, Brazil’s inflation fell to a
ing inflation with tight fiscal policies,
56-year low. The reason for this
downsizing the state, selling off pub
drop was no mystery. Sao Paulo’s
lic com panies in favor o f private
Fundagao Institucional de Pesquisa
enterprises and opening up heavily
Economica, an economic research
protected domestic markets to glob
institute, said in a report, “Inflation
al competition.
slowed because Brazil’s m ore open
The shouts of “Bucaram!
economy led to increased com peti
Bucaram!”reflect the growing impa
tion in prices.” M aintaining the pre
tience across Latin America with a
sent econom ic policy, the institute
decade or so o f economic reforms,
added confidently, “will keep infla
depending on the country in ques
tion low.”
tion. Those reform s have ushered in
The problem is that while inflation
unquestionable benefits, chief
now appears to be u n d er control,
unem ploym ent has soared to
unprecedented levels in several
Howard LaFranchi is a Mexico and
countries in the region. A rgentina’s
Latin America correspondent for the
unem ploym ent rate stands at
Christian Science Monitor in Mexico
between 17% and 18%, while
City.
Colombia’s rate of 13% is the high
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est in a decade. Latin Am erica’s
infamous incom e gap has also wors
ened. Brazil still tops the World
Bank’s list o f countries whose
income distribution paradigm is an
inverted pyramid—representing
enorm ous incomes for those at the
top with but a small slice left for the
masses at the bottom —but a recent
addition to this list is Chile, ostensi
bly the economic m odel for an
entire continent.
A survey in Chile showed that well
over half the population rejected the
economic m odel im plem ented by
General Augusto Pinochet and m ain
tained by his democratically elected
successors. In light of o th er data
showing that most Latin American
countries have not reduced poverty,
raised education levels, or improved
workers’ buying power, even those
international financial institutions
that advocate austerity program s and
econom ic openness have sounded
the alarm.
In 1996, the World Bank adm itted
that its free m arket policies had
failed to improve the living condi
tions o f the world’s poorest 20%.
The institution called on Latin
American nations to increase spend
ing on such social services as health
and education. Similarly, the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB)
w arned this year of the conse
quences of “reform fatigue,” result
ing from m ounting frustration over
fruitless promises.
Yet despite protests and other
signs o f exasperation, the catcalls in
Buenos Aires ring slightly hollow.
Bucaram was forced out of office
under rather unusual circumstances,
and no other governm ent in the
region has felt threatened enough
by protests and widespread public
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Despite its flaws, neoliberalism is here to stay

A slum clings to a hillside in Ecuador. The economic gains of neoliberal policies often do not trickle down to those who need them most.
In Latin America, the 7iumber of people living at the poverty level has reached 210 million.

discontent to change its economic
policies. N or does any Latin
American country appear to be on
the verge of social explosion.
Venezuela may have come close, but
despite 70% disapproval ratings for
President Rafael C aldera’s govern
m ent and crippling strikes by various
service sectors, a countrywide break
down seems unlikely.
Statistics and o th er evidence of
failed policies seem to shout out at
us every day. T he World Bank
reports that the num ber of people
living at the poverty level in Latin
America has reached 210 million, of
whom 58 million are children under

the age o f 15. In Argentina, 600,000
citizens have joined the ranks o f the
newly poor, and even in Chile, which
has reduced extrem e poverty over
the last six years, one in four inhabi
tants lives below the national poverty
line.
Why then has the widespread con
dem nation o f Latin Am erica’s eco
nom ic reform s—by religious leaders,
unions, teachers, academics and
workers, through press conferences,
studies, summits and dem onstra
tions—no t .progressed beyond the
protest stage to becom e a nascent
political movement? The answers
vary from one country to the next,

but together the factors upholding
reform significantly outweigh any
disenchantm ent.
First, those who lost u n d er neolib
eral reform s were already disenfran
chised. The unskilled, the poor and
those with little or no education
have minimal influence over policy.
In highly technical, decentralized
and globalized societies, such groups
are likely to be further marginalized,
with less of an organized voice.
Second, there are m ore voices
today, due to the spread of dem ocra
cy throughout the hem isphere.
Ironically, this characteristic of
dem ocratic societies has weakened
Hemisphere
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the forces o f criticism in Latin
America. The proliferation of politi
cal parties, think tanks, nongovern
m ental organizations (NGOs),
hum an and civil rights groups, con
sum er organizations and environ
mentalists has splintered the opposi
tion into many different factions.
T he result is a widening arc with
varying degrees o f support for, or
criticism of, the neoliberal model,
m aking the possibility of a collective
uprising against the status quo less
likely.
A particularly eloquent example
from Brazil provides one explana
tion for the lack of organized protest
against neoliberalism. Market
research shows that com pact disc
sales in Brazil doubled between April
1996 and March 1997, suggesting
that Latin Americans are too busy
shopping to worry about bringing
down the prevalent economic sys
tem. And if they’re no t buying—
which many are not—they’re win
dow-shopping, intoxicated by the
availability of a wider and m ore
affordable range of consum er prod
ucts.
Like people everywhere in this
increasingly globalized world, Latin
Americans are becom ing m ore indi
vidualist and consum er-oriented. In
Brazil alone, household ownership
of color television sets jum ped from
55% in 1991 to 90% last year. VCR
ownership rose from 31% to 58%,
while ownership of a refrigeratorfreezer increased from 28% to 54%.
During the same period, the num ber
o f Brazilians holding credit cards
rose from 18% to 32%. As m ore peo
ple becom e mass consumers, their
interest in variety and lower prices
grows— sometimes at the expense of
somebody else’s job. The closing of
local, formerly state-owned indus
tries is considered the price paid for
consum er dem ands. In this new
consum er context, shoppers tend to
equate state-owned m onopolies with
poor quality, waste and corruption.
This negative opinion contrasts with
Hemisphere • Volume Eight, Num ber Two

the good quality, efficiency and value
associated with privately-owned, and
in many cases, foreign companies.
This doesn’t m ean that Latin
Americans are uniformly elated with
their new, expanding role as con
sumers. Surveys show that people in
many countries in the region are
working longer hours, or additional
jobs, to purchase consum er goods
that their families now consider
necessities. In countries like Chile
and Argentina, it is not uncom m on
for a professional with a full-time jo b
to drive a taxi after hours to make
ends meet.
T hen there is the problem o f a
viable alternative for those who see
the neoliberal m odel as only exacer
bating Latin America’s woes. Despite
its criticism of m arket-oriented
reforms, for example, A rgentina’s
Alianza was quick to clarify after its
election victory that it would not
push for any radical detour from
M enem ’s economic model. And in a
recent interview, a Chilean econo
mist asked for an alternative to the
neoliberal policies he and his col
leagues oppose replied, “O ur dram a
is that we d o n ’t have an alternative
to propose.”
Not all critics of neoliberalism
would agree, or be so forthcom ing.
Last year, Mexican political scientist
Jorge Castaneda invited a group of
respected Latin Americans to
Mexico to form ulate a coherent,
workable alternative to neoliberal
ism. In a subsequent article,
Castaneda claimed that the founda
tion for such an alternative had been
laid. He neglected to explain, how
ever, exactly what the plan entailed.
Some observers argue that any
alternative plan should recognize
that hyperinflation is no longer a
real threat for the region, and that
low levels of inflation are accept
able—indeed, necessary—for achiev
ing the kind of growth rates needed
to tackle poverty. O ne Brazilian crit
ic has suggested that voters put local
governm ent in the hands of m ore

left-leaning or socially-minded gov
ernors who may act as a counter
weight to the neoliberals at the
national level. Neoliberal m acro
economics are unlikely to change
soon, he says, but local governm ents
can buck or soften the national
m odel, like the C om m unist Party
did in Italy.
W hat is the likely future of neolib
eralism in Latin America? The
shouting won’t go away, but neither
will the reforms. T here may be
some braking or detouring along
the way; for example, Mexico stalled
its privatization process when it
becam e clear it was hurting the rul
ing party’s popularity, and in
Argentina, the courts have h indered
some of M enem ’s reform efforts.
Brazil is probably the best barom e
ter of the direction neoliberalism is
taking in the region, although it is
generally behind its neighbors in
the reform process. No one expects
President Cardoso to reverse his
governm ent’s present course,
despite the tem porary setback p ro
vided by the recent m arket crisis.
A nother trend that will continue
within the econom ic reform process
is the extension of trade accords
and the creation o f what could con
ceivably becom e a hem ispheric
trade zone—m inus the U nited
States. While the US has pretty
m uch wasted the past three years
when it comes to launching trade
initiatives with Latin America—we
all rem em ber that Clinton invited
Chile to join Nafta back in 1995—
Latin American countries, from
Mexico to Argentina, have not been
idle. They now have m ore than a
dozen trade agreem ents am ong
themselves and the n um ber keeps
growing. As form er Bolivian
President Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada said in Atlanta earlier this
year, “We think we’ll have by the
year 2000 at least...a trading bloc
com prising all o f South Am erica.”
T h at’s hardly the voice o f a region
pulling back from neoliberalism. ■
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Seeki ng “A New Pat h”
Andres Oppenheimer

ill the defeat of
President
C linton’s “fast
track” authority
to sign new free
trade agree
m ents generate a backlash in Latin
A strong, active and financially healthy state is a necessary preco n 
America? Will the increasingly pow
dition for, n o t an enem y of, a dem ocratized m arket economy. To this
erful center-left coalitions in Mexico
and A rgentina shift away from a USend, we should aim for increased tax collection that progressively
proposed hem ispheric free trade
reaches international levels. To reconcile increased levels o f taxation
bloc?
with the n eed for private savings an d investm ent, we should consider
T he answer is yes, according to a
docum ent p repared by potential
im plem entation o f a range o f options. W hen properly adm inistered,
presidential candidates from some
indirect consum ption taxes—generally in the form of a value-added
o f Latin A m erica’s leading opposi
tion parties. The d ocum ent in
tax—can attain this objective. T he regressive slant o f such taxes is
question—a 24-page m anifesto enti
m ore than com pensated for by the redistributive effects o f the social
tled, “After Neoliberalism: A New
spending that they fund. C ertain types of direct taxes also play an
P ath ”—was released in Buenos Aires
in Novem ber 1997. T he alternative
im portant redistributive role: a progressive tax on personal con
vision of developm ent presented in
sum ption (based on the difference between a citizen’s total earnings
its pages may have a significant
and proven savings); an estate tax, with special em phasis on in h eri
im pact on US exports— and jobs—
in com ing years.
tances and charitable contributions; and a tax on natural resources,
T he explicit critique o f neoliberal
to set aside a portion o f the profits from such deposits for the n ation
ism was the result of four m eetings
in Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica by
al patrimony. Swift punishm ent o f tax evasion and broaden in g the
a group o f centrist and leftist politi
base o f contributors are fu rth e r key elem ents o f fiscal reform .
cians, several o f whom have a good
Latin Am erican governm ents should strive to eradicate co rru p tio n ,
shot at w inning th eir countries’
n ext presidential elections.
dishonesty and inefficiency so that every fiscal dollar yields its maxi
M embers o f the group, informally
m um productivity in social and hum an term s. In some countries,
known as “the Buenos Aires
Consensus,” included Mexican
where dom estic d eb t siphons off a large part o f public finances and
politicians Vicente Fox,
produces astronom ical interest rates, the state m ust be restored to fis
C uauhtem oc Cardenas, Manuel
cal health. T he m ethods for achieving this goal can include privati
Cam acho and Andres Manuel
Lopez O brador; form er Brazilian
zation, as long as the profits o f such sales are channeled toward reduc
president Itam ar Franco and lead
ing dom estic debt and the interest paid by the governm ent and pri
ing opposition candidate Luiz
vate entities on international loans. We reject the practice o f using
Ignacio “Lula” da Silva; A rgentine
opposition leaders Graciela
privatization to finance the cu rren t account o r pay off foreign debt.

W

Excerpts from “After
Liberalism: A New Path”

Privatization should be im plem ented on a case by case basis, n o t as a
Andres Oppenheimer is a columnist at
the Miami Herald.
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Fernandez Meijide, Carlos “C hacho”
Alvarez and Rodolfo Terragno; and
Ricardo Lagos, C hile’s public works
minister. Nevertheless, the docu
m ent makes it clear that no t all par
ticipants agreed on all points. The
final product was no t signed, to
avoid tim e-consum ing debates over
details, and at least one of the origi
nal m em bers of the group— Brazil’s
da Silva— has already asked that his
nam e be removed.
Despite these drawbacks, the
g ro u p ’s attack on neoliberalism rep
resents an opposition consensus on
m ajor issues, including the follow
ing points:

m atter o f ideological dogm a. New state-owned enterprises could be
created tomorrow, while others are sold to the private sector today.
Privatization is a useful tool for breaking up property and spurring
com petition, no t simply a way for public m onopolies to pass into pri
vate ownership. Above all, policy m akers m ust bear in m ind three
points whose absence has already taken a toll on Latin America. First,
countries should have long-term developm ent strategies th at set
broad param eters for growth. Privatization, as well as the conserva
tion o r creation o f state-run enterprises, should fit within these para
m eters.

Second, there is a vital need for institutions to oversee

the sale o f state-owned com panies, ensuring the transparency and
fiscal logic o f privatization. Such institutions are necessary to avoid

>■ “To set in m otion m echanisms
for regulating speculative foreign
investm ent.” The group suggests
following the exam ple o f Chile and
Malaysia by limiting massive
overnight withdrawals from local
stock markets, in an effort to pre
vent the sudden waves of capital
flight th at periodically cripple Latin
Am erican economies.

obvious abuses—such as influence trafficking, leaking privileged
inform ation and selling below m arket value—and to make sure that
the choice o f buyers is in the best national interest, with the funds
for purchase deriving from legitim ate activities. T hird, m ost Latin
A m erican countries lack the regulatory fram ework to supervise pri
vate com panies that acquire a sem im onopoly on public services.
W ithout such a fram ework, privatization can be harm ful and coun
terproductive. ■

>- “M ore integration am ong our
selves, and less with others.” The
group hopes to strengthen and
expand Mercosur, the South
Am erican free trade agreem ent that
includes A rgentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay. T he logic behind this
argum ent is th at Latin America
should becom e a strong free trade
bloc in its own right before engag
ing in trade negotiations with the
U nited States.
>- “T he taxation rate should rise
progressively to international lev
els.” Wealthy Latin Am ericans pay
significantly less taxes than their
counterparts in the U nited States or
Europe. The d o cum ent proposes
new value-added taxes, as well as
m ore stringent taxation o f charita
ble contributions and inheritances.
>- “Privatization should be im ple
m ented on a case by case basis, not
8
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as a m atter o f ideological dogm a.”
The docum ent argues that the pur
pose o f privatization is to fragm ent
ownership and encourage com peti
tion, n o t simply to transform key
industries from state m onopolies
into private m onopolies.
>- “We m ust open up the com m uni
cations media, which in m ost Latin
Am erican countries have passed
from state control into the hands of
private m onopolies.” T he concen
tration of radio and television
licenses should be limited, as it is in
the U nited States, to prevent news
m onopolies in specific markets.
Jorge Castaneda, the Mexican
political scientist and New York
University professor who organized
the m eetings along with Brazilian-

b orn H arvard Law School professor
R oberto M angabeira Unger, insists
that the Buenos Aires Consensus
will no t undo the econom ic reform s
u ndertaken by m ost Latin American
countries.
“W hat has been done is a given,”
C astaneda says. “T h ere’s no going
back on it. This is a new set o f pro
posals that has noth in g to do with
the im port substitution or big gov
ern m e n t schemes of the past.”
Will the Buenos Aires Consensus
stand the scrutiny o f economists?
O ne thing at least is clear. In light
of recent events— the victory of cen
ter-left coalitions in Mexico and
A rgentina, the setback to Clinton's
“fast track” proposal and the col
lapse of Latin Am erican stock m ar
kets— the g ro u p ’s proposals will be
taken m ore seriously than ever. ■
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Mexi co’s Nine-Fingered President
George W. Grayson

n Mexico City, storytellers like
to regale visitors with tales of
Mexican heroes’ missing
appendages. Some insist that
nineteenth-century dictator
Antonio Lopez Santa Ana
buried a lost leg amid pom p and cir
cumstance. Others recall the am pu
tated arm of revolutionary paladin
General Alvaro Obregon, who wore
his empty sleeve as a badge of valor
when successfully running for presi
dent in 1924 and 1928.
Since the July 6, 1997 setback suf
fered by the ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in key mid
term elections, local raconteurs have
added the nation’s “nine-fingered”
president to the list. Ernesto Zedillo,
figuratively speaking, has lopped off
his index finger: at least with respect
to handpicking some major office
holders in the time-honored practice
known as the dedaw (after the
Spanish word for finger, dedo).
In an act of political self-mutilation,
Zedillo divested selection of Mexico
City’s mayor from the presidency,
proposing an off-year ballot that
nonetheless drew an overwhelming
75% turnout. And once the electoral
results flashed across TV screens,
Mexico’s 47-year-old jefe took placato
ry actions never before witnessed
within his party which, since assum
ing power in 1929, has treated politi
cal foes with all the tenderness of
Cromwell ruling Ireland. Zedillo not
only congratulated Cuauhtem oc
Cardenas—the winning candidate

George W. Grayson teaches governmen t
at the College of William & Mary.
His eighth book on Mexico, “Mexico:
Corporatism to Pluralism?” was pub
lished by Harcourt-Brace in late 1997.
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from the leftist-nationalist
Democratic Revolutionary Party
(PRD)—but also invited the mayorelect to m eet personally in the presi
dential palace. After the requisite
socializing and photo opportunity,
Zedillo prom ised to endorse
Cardenas’ candidates for the capital’s
police chief and attorney general,
despite the fact that nam ing these
officials is a prerogative that has rest
ed with the chief executive for most
of this century.
Such “cavorting with the enemy,”
in the words of one critic, appeals to
the PRI's contingent of machinepolitics “dinosaurs” as m uch as would
gargling glass shards. Led by toughas-nails governors Manuel Bartlett
Diaz (Puebla), Roberto Madrazo
Pintado (Tabasco), Victor Cevera
Pacheco (Yucatan), and union hon
cho Leonardo “La G uera” Rodriguez
Alcaine, these hardliners see in the
mid-summer election the imperative
for confronting, not appeasing, their
adversaries.
Why did the PRD sweep Mexico
City by a two-to-one margin? Who
bears responsibility for the loss of two
additional governorships, raising to
six (of 31) the num ber o f statehouses
held by the center-right National
Action Party (PAN)? What account
ed for the PRI’s squandering of its
majority in Mexico’s 500-member
Cham ber of Deputies? These are a
few of the compelling questions that
the party needs to address.
Bardett and his cohorts have drawn
up a plan of action for the PRI to
avoid future debacles at the voting
booth. Their priorities include:
selecting candidates m ore likely to
appeal to the electorate; running
m ore skillful campaigns; giving no
quarter to PRD and PAN “crybabies,”

quick to claim election fraud at the
first hint of unfavorable results; play
ing hardball with the press by with
holding government advertising from
publications whose reporters fail to
write puff pieces about the PRI; and
employing the regim e’s legitimate
resources to reward loyalists and
mobilize voters. “After all,” observed
one portly boss, “no one in your
country raised a fuss when Bill
Clinton jetted around the US on Air
Force One, stumping for Democratic
candidates in 1996, just as George
Bush had done for the Republicans
four years earlier.”
PRI veterans buttress their argu
ments by pointing to last July’s voting
tallies in the states under their con
trol. There, with the exception of
PAN-dominated cities, the official
party demolished its opponents—
with few morning-after yowls of
fraud.
Zedillo’s allies in the PRI point to
different lessons from the mid-year
election results and dismiss the old
guard’s calls for cosmetic change to
party tactics as too little, too late. As
of early 1998, the PRI’s approval rat
ing stood at an anemic 25%. Party
reformers—including Senators Elba
Esther Gordillo, de facto head of the
prom inent Teachers' Union, chief of
the PRI’s white-collar “popular sec
tor” and the country’s leading female
politician; and Esteban Moctezuma
Barragan, Zedillo’s movie-star hand
some alter ego—contend that the
recent reverses call for root-andbranch reforms. In their view, the
PRI must abandon its status as an
arm of the governing hierarchy,
assuming a more critical attitude
toward official policies. They call on
the party to devise a m ore coherent,
m oderate program, attractive to the
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Can Zedillo hold the PRI together without the dedazo?

nonideological majority of Mexican
voters. Besides banning the dedazo,
they argue, the PRI should open all
decisions to rank-and-file members.
They place particular emphasis on
courting previously ignored con
stituencies such as women, environ
mentalists, shantytown dwellers and,
especially, young people—82% of
whom voted for the opposition in the
Mexico City mayoral elections.
This divergence of views could
spark a brawl at the next m eeting of
the PRI’s National Political Council,

the party's central committee, tenta
tively scheduled for mid-1998. After
hardliners clash with reformers, the
party headquarters on Avenida
Insurgentes Norte may be reduced to
rubble. Even if one side prevails, the
PRI itself will have lost the struggle,
making its chance of holding onto
the presidency in 2000 about as likely
as Mexico’s changing its national
anthem to the “Star-Spangled
Banner.”
In its favor, the PRI boasts astute
coalition-builders such as new

Governm ent Secretary Francisco
Labastida Ochoa and Senators
Gordillo and Moctezuma—potential
worthy successors to Zedillo, who is
limited to a single, six-year term
under the country’s constitution.
C ontinued economic expansion in
1998 and 1999 would make this list of
hopefuls look even better vis-a-vis the
alternatives in the PAN and PRD.
Despite his best efforts to undergo
a political facelift, Cuauhtem oc
Cardenas won the capital elections
m ore as a result of street-level ani
mosity toward the PRI than pro-PRD
sentiment. Indeed, the PRD m ore
closely resembles a Mideast bazaar
than an organized party, as disaffect
ed priistas, social democrats,
Trotskyites and hard-core Stalinists
vie for influence within its ranks.
Before campaign advisors convinced
him to smile occasionally and preach
the virtues of free enterprise and
m oderation during the July elections,
the Yankee-bashing Cardenas railed
against Nafta, lauded protectionism
and touted the virtues of big govern
m ent. A lackluster governor of
Michoacan state in the early 1980s,
Cardenas must now show his mettle
in adm inistering a city—called
“ungovernable” by some urban
experts—beset by crime, pollution,
gridlock and unem ploym ent if he
hopes to be a credible presidential
contender.
The m ore conventional PAN aug
ments its com m itm ent to capitalism
with social Christian precepts. After
the party’s candidate for mayor of
Mexico City finished last am ong the
major contenders, a new cadre of
politicians with strong ties to business
sought greater influence within the
PAN. The favorite of these so-called
“northern barbarians” for the presiHemisphere
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dency in 2000 is successful
Guanajuato governor and ex-Coca
Cola executive Vicente Fox Quesada,
a blue jean clad, shoot-from-the-hip
populist who tailors his message to
suit his audience. Much to his dis
may, Fox—already at odds with ortho
dox panistas—may have to compete
with popular C hihuahua Governor
Francisco Barrios, another northern
barbarian.
Fortunately for the PRI, its national
conclave does not have to end like a
Greek tragedy. Although personal
and ideological differences will per
vade the meeting, key decision mak
ers in the 69-year-old party share an
emphatically pragmatic outlook.
There is widespread consensus that
the divided forces within the PRI
must forge a rapprochem ent, lest
m odern Mexico’s dom inant political
force find itself relegated to has-been
status after the 2000 elections.
In fact, Zedillo—once prepared to
take a “hands-off’ approach—now
realizes that the next national con
tests are too im portant for him to
remain on the sidelines. Soon after
his inauguration in December 1994,
the new chief executive found him 
self overwhelmed by a currency
devaluation and subsequent deep
recession. The brainy, Yale-trained
economist threw himself into obtain
ing external loans, cutting the federal
budget, raising selected taxes and
pushing ahead with the local version
of perestroika. His herculean efforts
bore fruit last year as the economy,
which nose-dived 6.9% in 1995, grew
7% amid tumbling prices and sub
stantial jo b creation. Nevertheless,
these gains came too late to stave off
the PRI’s losses at the polls.
While tackling the economic crisis,
the technocratic Zedillo—with scant
experience in politics before reach
ing the presidential palace—delegat
ed the political heavy lifting to thenGovernm ent Secretary Emilio
Chuayffet Chemor. This veteran
wheeler-dealer, n am ed in the State of
Mexico’s Machiavellian political
1 2 Hemisphere
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machine, became virtual prim e min
ister. Even as Zedillo and his eco
nomic team racked up one success
after another, Chuayffet—an oldschool m anipulator uncomfortable
with Mexico’s recent political open
ing—botched one assignment after
another. His Keystone Kops tactics
led to a bungled attem pt to grab con
trol of the Cham ber of Deputies after
the July 1997 elections, and he
showed little imagination in resolving
the festering conflict in Chiapas,
where he refused to recognize selfgoverning Indian enclaves in return
for Zapatista concessions.
Chuayffet’s inability to bring clo
sure to the Chiapas problem cost
Zedillo dearly when masked gun
m en—allegedly linked to the PRI—
slaughtered 45 Tzotzil Indians on
Decem ber 22, 1997. This massacre
prom pted the president to sack
Chuayffet and appoint Labastida
Ochoa, a 55-year-old career politician
with experience as a governor, diplo
m at and cabinet member. Until
becoming government secretary,
Labastida ran the Ministry of
Agriculture, where he observed first
hand the grinding misery that afflicts
most chiapanecos and, indeed, half of
Mexico’s 97 million inhabitants. His
appointm ent dem onsnates Zedillo’s
increasing confidence in his own
political judgm ent. Making peace in
Chiapas will not only boost
Labastida's political star, but will
enable the president to com plem ent
economic opening with m ore ambi
tious political liberalization.
Which priorities have the best
chance of bringing the PRI’s clashing
factions closer together? At the top
of the list are creating jobs, improv
ing education, broadening health
care and combatting crime in cities
and rural areas. Just as im portant is
reinvigorating the Solidarity
Program, a grassroots, antipoverty ini
tiative launched by Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, Zedillo’s once-lionized, nowvilified predecessor. His recent tribu
lations aside, Salinas understood that

political stability implied a genuine
social stake for Mexico’s lower classes,
even as irreversible changes buffeted
the economy. Nevertheless, the PRI
would have to reinvent the Solidarity
Program under a new name; in the
present climate, as political scientist
Oscar Aguilar Asencio has pointed
out, any venture associated with the
ex-president is automatically branded
with a “political swastika.”
Mexico’s leadership might also
consider modifying Nafta to post
pone elimination o f tariffs on corn
and other grains. Otherwise, most
com m unal farms, or ejidos—especially
in the poverty-stricken, violenceprone states of Chiapas, G uerrero
and Oaxaca—will be unable to com
pete with the US agribusiness giants
poised to achieve full entry into the
Mexican m arket early in the next
century. By then, the largely
unskilled campesino population will
have grown to 30 or 40 million peo
ple. Those unable to land jobs in the
countryside will overflow into
Mexican cities, cross the Rio Grande,
aggravate the drug crisis in the
United States or join the guerrilla
movements active in Mexico’s south
ern states.
O n the whole, three factors bode
well for the PRI's survival, although
predictions for the year 2000 are still
prem ature. First, just as a rising tide
lifts all boats, economic gains should
enhance the PRI’s standing with vot
ers, although turm oil in Asian mar
kets accom panied by the fall in oil
prices has forced the president to
trim his ambitious 1998 budget.
Second, Zedillo may have found in
Labastida the m an who can bridge
the gap between the party’s warring
camps. And finally, although still
spurning use of the dedazo, Mexico’s
increasingly popular chief executive
can prom ote party unity by vetoing
the nom ination of Bartlett, Madrazo
or other reform-averse bitter-enders
whose selection would ensure the
PRI’s political dism em berm ent at the
hands of the electorate. ■
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reinforce the core learning concepts.
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tion, the im pact o f international laws on inter
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arena. Further, participants are exposed to issues
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Reports: Jamaica

Patrolling the Polls
Gary Brana-Shute

ince Jam aica’s democratic
system took root in 1944
with universal adult suf
frage, national politics
have been characterized by
a regular pendulum swing
of two terms each for the island’s
main political forces, the People’s
National Party (PNP) and the
Jam aican Labour Party (JLP). This
trend has been accom panied by a ris
ing spiral of political violence, with
1976, 1980 and 1993 rem em bered as
particularly bloody years.
The country’s most recent elec
tions, on Decem ber 18, 1997,
brought new hope of breaking this
cycle. Incum bent Prime Minister P.J.
Patterson led the PNP to a historic
third victory over the JLP and its
leader, Edward Seaga. In the final
tally, the PNP won 50 of the 60 parlia
m entary seats at stake and 56% of the
popular vote. The JLP acquired 10
seats with about 40% of the vote, and
the National Democratic Movement
(NDM), a JLP splinter group led by
Bruce Golding, won 5% of the vote
but no seats. Total voter turnout was
about 65%, although it varied by con
stituency; in some rural areas, the fig
ure averaged less than 50%.
Perhaps m ore im portant than the
election results, however, were the
relative Uansparency o f the political
process and the low level of political
violence that accom panied it. In
1993, nearly one-third of constituen
cies were decided by less than 500
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A pair of soldiers beefs up security at the Tel Aviv polling station in Kingston. Photo:
Gary Brana-Shute.

votes, creating a situation in which
violence and intimidation became
key determ inants of voting behavior.
Observers feared a repeat of this per
formance in 1997, but both local par
ticipants and international onlookers
were relieved to report elections that
were peaceful, orderly and open.
T h e P r e pa r a t io n s

As Election Day approached in late
1997, the m ood on the sneets and
the tone of the political debate indi
cated a change from the political
gridlock and violence that usually
precede elections in Jamaica. Politics
here are dom inated by garrison con
stituencies, essentially arm ed camps
that pledge their loyalty to political
parties in exchange for all m anner of
patronage. These bastions of oneparty rule are potential powder kegs
for political violence. This time, how
ever, polidcal tribalism and garrison
warfare were denounced in the
m edia and on street corners.

Control over key parliamentary seats,
long dom inated by a particular party,
suddenly seemed less certain.
Jamaicans seemed to be exercising
m ore choice in their political
options, with traditional dependency
on leadership giving way to a new
sense of “followership” that called
into question traditional party alle
giances.
Local and international observer
groups made an effort to ensure the
transparency of the electoral process.
Civic Action for Free and Fair
Elections, a local NGO, offered to
m onitor polling stations, hoping to
deter through its presence the most
blatant instances of ballot stuffing,
theft and tu rf wars between rival
gangs. The Electoral Office also
invited the Carter C enter to observe
the elections, the first time an inter
national organization was asked to
play such a role in Jamaica. This ini
tiative was welcomed by the JLP and
NDM but opposed by the PNP until

Reports: Jamaica

Jamaica moves towards peaceful elections

An armed personnel carrier guards the Denham Town polling station, Kingston.
Photo: Gary Brana-Shute.

R obert Pastor, the director o f the
C arter Center, persuaded the leaders
of the three parties to agree to a
truce during the elections. Ultimate
ly, Pastor’s was the only voice believed
when national radio confirmed that
the margin of erro r on the voter rolls
was negligible and that the elections
could proceed. His 60-member
observation team was joined for sev
eral days by President and Mrs.
Carter, General Colin Powell and
world heavyweight boxing champion
Evander Holyfield.
The Jam aican governm ent itself
instituted various electoral reforms,
including a mechanism for halting
procedures and reballoting if mal
practice was reported at any polling
station. These reforms were backed
by the presence of Jam aica’s security
forces. Every one of the country’s
6,332 polling stations had arm ed
police on duty; in Kingston, police
with body arm or and automatic
weapons were jo ined by soldiers who

secured defensive perimeters around
the stations. Snipers took up posi
tions on rooftops, and columns of
arm ored personnel carriers rum bled
along major thoroughfares. Soldiers
patrolled Kingston’s labyrinth of gul
lies, and fleets of motorcycle police
were on call if necessary. Helicopters
crisscrossed overhead. If the posses
and political gangs were arm ed, the
security forces had upped the ante.
Despite these preparations, howev
er, Prime Minister Patterson was criti
cized for calling elections without
allowing for adequate time to pre
pare an updated voter registration list
and the sophisticated voter identifica
tion technology to guard against
fraud.
E l e c t io n D ay

On Election Day itself, the garrison
communities were sealed off. In the
capital, West Kingston and Seaga’s
fabled strongholds of Tivoli Gardens
and Denham Town turned out on

cue; one polling station reported 178
votes for the JLP against only one for
the PNP. South St. Andrew—a dis
trict that includes Jones Town,
Trench Town and Rema, the sites of
much bloodshed in the past—gave its
votes to PNP finance minister O m ar
Davies. Central Kingston and the
boroughs of Alman Town and Tel
Aviv went to new PNPer Ronnie
Thwaites, a middle-aged activist
lawyer from the 1970s. In Rae Town,
bordering Central and East Kingston,
gangs of JLP young m en chanted,
“Showa, Showa” (for Shower, the
nam e of the posse associated with the
JLP and which, through its “dons” or
“rankin’s,” runs the neighborhood
and its “foreign relations”) . Faces
painted green, they invaded a Tel
Aviv polling station that was fortified
like Fort Apache, only to find them 
selves outgunned by Jam aican army
troops. Fortunately for all involved,
the army, usually all too ready to use
force, did not fire a single shot all
day. What gunfire there was came
from lone shooters and political sabo
teurs, who raked polling stations with
bullets or opened up on passing cars
rum ored to hold politicians from
other parties.
Suburban and rural areas tended
to lean toward their traditional pref
erences. Labor Minister Portia
Simpson, known as the gunwoman of
the PNP and head of a large garrison
in Southwest St. Andrew, won handily
in the area known as “Miss Portia’s
constituency.” There were some
exceptions, however; in suburban
N orth St. Andrew, JLP newcomer
Delroy Chuck won a surprise victory
over the PNP incumbent. A nother
unexpected result was Bruce
Golding’s loss to the formidable
Olivia “Babsy” Grange in the rough
Hemisphere • Volume Eight, N um ber Two
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city of Spanish Town. Miss Babsy
wanted that seat back for the JLP, but
h er victory came only after tense vot
ing during which a female poll m oni
tor was fatally stabbed.
This m urder was the only one
directly connected to political vio
lence during the elections. Three
other homicides occurred technically
before and after the polls were open,
and have been traced to drug deals
or personal animosities. The final
tally for Election Day thus included
four deaths; two stolen ballot boxes,
one of which was retrieved; shots
fired; and intimidation of candidates
and their supporters. O ne case
involved the kidnapping of a PNP
polling supervisor by an angry mob
in the JLP snonghold of Rae Town.
He described his experience as
“being held captive behind enemy
lines.”
In Barbados, where elections dis
play the rectitude of a Swiss canton,
this sort of behavior would be
grounds for national outrage. By
Jam aican standards, however, it was
an encouraging perform ance. The
low level of violence did not go unap
preciated by the rank-and-file; in a
run-down, filthy elem entary school in
Trench Town, an old woman shoved
her folded ballot through the slot of
a grey metal box and, oblivious to the
20 heavily-armed m en who surround
ed her, raised h er arms and cried,
“Oh, thank you Jesus, ‘dis too sweet—
las’ time we dead like dog.”
T here were reports of voter fraud,
b u t by all accounts it was not suffi
cient to affect the outcome of the
elections. In Angola, a JLP outpost
in East Kingston, observers encoun
tered several polling stations where
presiding officers had boldly opened
ballot boxes and were busy stuffing
them with extra ballots. The officers
reported 156 votes for the JLP and
one for the PNP, but there were only
136 ticks on the tally sheet. To make
up for this discrepancy, they filled out
20 m ore ballots themselves. Since
police officers were not allowed to
16 Hemisphere
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BREAKING THE CYCLE
The PNP’s victory in the Decem ber 1997 elections m arked the first time in
Jam aica’s democratic history that one party rem ained in power for more
than two terms. Dates in bold represent JLP victories; regular typeface indicates a
PNP victory.
1944, 1949, 1955, 1959, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1976,1980, 1983, 1989, 1993, 1997

enter polling stations, they were pre
sumably ignorant of such violations.
C o n t in u in g P roblem s

Political violence is the forem ost
obstacle facing the dem ocratic
process in Jamaica. This problem
has intensified as the garrisons aug
m ent their traditional activities with
drug trafficking, gunrunning, docu
m ent forgery, smuggling o f aliens
and links to criminal gangs abroad,
primarily in the U nited States.
Children as young as nine or ten,
known as “fryers” (small chickens),
carry out arm ed missions for the
garrison com m anders. Sadly, this
culture of violence has become
deeply rooted in the fabric of
Jam aican life and will no t easily yield
to attacks by reform -m inded politi
cians.
The 1997 electoral process was
also m arred by administrative bun
gles. Polling station officers failed to
show up; voting materials, such as
ballots and ID cards, were not deliv
ered on time; people who insisted
they had registered did no t appear
on the voting lists and were turned
away; and there was confusion over
where to vote. Because Patterson
called the elections without much
advance notice, the Electoral Office
was unable to produce all of its voter
cards on time and had to hastily
update the old voter registration list.
To add to this chaos, voters and can
didates were subject to intim idation
in the form of roadblocks, jeering
and harassm ent, gunfire, and gang
m em bers who prohibited voters
from crossing their tu rf to reach
polling stations.

The elections could not have been
carried out as smoothly as they were
without the help of the Jamaican
security forces, which helped protect
voters from intimidation, posses, pri
vateers and freelance crooks. The
perform ance of the army and police,
as well as the equipm ent at their dis
posal, was vastly superior to that of
the 1980s and warrants continued
upgrading and assistance.
Despite the relatively peaceful out
come of the last elections, however,
the underlying structures and voting
patterns of Jam aican politics remain
unchanged. The JLP shrank back to
its original garrison base and sup
porters among the m erchant elite,
while the PNP, appealing to Jamaican
nationalism, surged ahead with the
support of marginal voters. And yet,
some familiar faces seemed destined
for retirem ent, allowing new leaders
to take their places. With the PNP’s
victory, Edward Seaga seems finished,
while Bruce Golding suffered a
humiliating setback. Patterson him
self appears to have reached the apex
of his career, and rum ors are already
circulating that Health Minister Peter
Phillips is his likely successor.
Jam aica’s biggest problem is its
economy, which has not improved
substantially over the past decade no
m atter which party was in office. The
new government must restore growth
and deal with Jam aica’s myriad social
problems, including violence and
drugs. And while the 1997 elections
were a positive om en for the future
of the country’s political system,
Jam aica’s leaders must institutionalize
electoral reforms that will ensure fur
ther peaceful transitions. ■
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Frontiers of Development
Allan Rosenbaum

erhaps the most interest
ing aspect o f any discus
sion regarding the role
of local governm ent in
prom oting econom ic
developm ent in Latin
America is simply the fact that it is
occurring. Such a discussion would
have been virtually u n h eard of little
m ore than a decade ago, when
issues related to econom ic develop
m ent were dealt with alm ost exclu
sively at the national level.
Concerns such as local job creation
took a back seat to controlling infla
tion and o th er m acroeconom ic
objectives; even the largest m unici
palities lacked the resources and the
infrastructure to play a significant
role in econom ic developm ent.
Obviously, m uch has changed in
Latin Am erica over the past decade.
W hereas 15 years ago m ost local
officials were app o inted by the cen
tral governm ent, today alm ost all
mayors and m unicipal council
m em bers are chosen by popular
election. M unicipal officials are
now closely involved in redefining
local policy agendas, thus helping
to change the n ature o f political
accountability and responsiveness
in the region. This transform ation
has co n tributed to the dispersion of
political power th ro u g h o u t the
region and is central to the dem oc
ratization process occurring all
across Latin America.
Perhaps equally im portant, how
ever, the process o f decentralization

P

Allan Rosenbaum is director of the
Institute for Public Management and
Community Services and professor of
public administration at Florida
International University.
18 Hemisphere • Volume Eight, Num ber Two

is also changing patterns o f service
delivery th ro u g h o u t the hem i
sphere. T he reason for this is sim
ple: As the role o f m unicipal gov
ernm ents increases, local officials
recognize the connection between
effective services and the likelihood
o f success in the next election. The
em ergence o f local governm ent as
a significant presence in an increas
ingly dem ocratic Latin Am erica has
created a healthy com petition
between national and subnational
governm ents. At the local level,
this trend has helped create close
linkages between econom ic devel
opm ent, jo b creation and the rise
o f strong and effective m unicipal
governm ents.
L o c a l G o v e r n a n c e a n d E c o n o m ic
D e v e lo p m e n t

This relationship is very im por
tant, because there is a clear corre
lation between the strength of local
governm ent and the relative level
o f a country’s econom ic develop
m ent, as evidenced by the differing
p roportion o f governm ental expen
diture and em ploym ent found at
the subnational level. In N orth
Am erica and Europe, an average of
50% o f all governm ental expendi
ture and 57% of all governm ental
em ploym ent occurs at the subna
tional level. By com parison, in
Asia— the scene o f rapid econom ic
developm ent over the past
decade— the figures for expendi
ture and em ploym ent are 30% and
37%, respectively, while in Africa—
the least economically developed
region of the world— rates are as
low as 10% and 6%. Latin America
falls som ewhere in between the two,
with 19% o f governm ental expendi
ture and 21% of governm ental

em ploym ent at the subnational
level.
T he reasons for the correlation
between econom ic developm ent
and governm ental activity at the
subnational level are obvious.
Econom ic developm ent does not
spring magically from the environ
m ent. It depends on such factors as
local initiative, adaptability and
capacity; basic infrastructure to
facilitate business, com m ercial or
industrial activity; a supportive legal
framework; and the ability to m obi
lize necessary resources and
respond rapidly to an ever-changing
environm ent. These requirem ents
are m ost easily m et when local
authorities have the capability to
cooperate with en trep ren eu rs—be
they local or national— to initiate
new econom ic developm ent.
A perfect exam ple of these trends
is a part o f the U nited States famil
iar to many Latin Americans: the
state o f Florida. D uring the past
decade, the Disney W o rld /O rlan d o
e n tertain m en t com plex and the
M iam i/D ade air- and seaport have
em erged as two o f the m ost signifi
cant forces for econom ic develop
m ent in the state. T he D isney/
O rlando area now possesses m ore
hotel room s than any o th er m etro
politan area in the country, while
com m ercial activity at M iam i’s airand seaport has tu rn ed a oncesleepy tourist town into a m ajor
center o f international trade, bank
ing and tourism.
Were it n o t for the highly decen
tralized n ature o f governm ent in
the US, these rem arkable engines
o f local econom ic developm ent
would n o t exist at all. U n d er a cen
tralized system, political forces from
C alifornia (then a m uch larger and
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Local governments in Latin America play an important
role in promoting economic growth and democracy
m ore pow erful state than Florida)
would have u n d o u btedly blocked
th e creation o f th e extensive infra
stru ctu re necessary to establish the
Disney W orld com plex. Likewise,
states such as New York and
M aryland (both sites o f m ajor
ports) could have discouraged
investm ent in the construction of
p o rt facilities in th e M iam i/D ade
C ounty area. These projects were
m ade possible by the fact th at local
governm ents in th e US enjoy sig
n ificant autonom y, including the
capacity to raise revenue and the
au th o rity to m odify the legal
fram ew ork to facilitate econom ic
dev elopm ent activities.
S tr a te g ie s f o r L o c a l Job
G e n e r a t io n a n d E c o n o m ic
D e v e lo p m e n t

As local officials in Latin
A m erica becom e co n c ern e d about
issues o f jo b developm ent, th eir
initial ap p ro ach resem bles th at of
th eir N o rth A m erican co u n terp arts
th ree o r fo u r decades ago. T heir
first efforts te n d to focus on luring
m ajor corporations, factories and
com m ercial en terp rises to their
com m unities. This strategy has
always b een politically attractive,
since large facilities are likely to
g en erate favorable m edia atten 
tion; however, th e n u m b er o f large
co rp o ratio n s available for re cru it
m en t is lim ited at any p o in t in
tim e an d can n o t be relied on to
m eet th e em ploym ent an d devel
o p m en t needs o f m ost local com 
m unities. T h ere has b een an
increasing realization, in both
N o rth an d South Am erica, o f the
n eed to ad o p t new approaches to
jo b creation. Consequently, local
officials are paying m ore attention

to small businesses an d th eir
potential to gen erate local em ploy
m ent. Such en terprises have
played an im p o rtan t role in jo b
creation d u rin g the past two
decades.
Studies show th at 50-80% o f all
new jo b s in the US are created by
com panies with less than 100
em ployees. A dditional research
suggests th at com panies with
u n d e r 20 em ployees pro d u ce as
m any as two-thirds o f all new jobs.
Similar p attern s o f developm ent
are begin n in g to be recognized in
Latin A m erica an d the C aribbean,
p o p u lar relocation sites for largescale p ro d u ctio n plants from o th er
regions. In one study, the InterA m erican D evelopm ent Bank
(IDB) fo u n d th at small a n d m edi
um-sized com panies account for
one-third o f the re g io n ’s jo b s and

GDP. Such com panies, however,
are responsible for the creation o f
at least 50% o f all new jo b s in
Latin A m erica an d the C aribbean.
In light o f these statistics, it is
clear th at m unicipalities th at focus
th eir efforts on lurin g large busi
nesses can m eet only a p art o f
th eir econom ic developm ent and
em ploym ent needs. Ultimately,
large com panies do n o t g en erate
as m any new jo b s as do small busi
nesses. F u rth erm o re, th e ability to
play one po ten tial location off
against an o th e r allows big com pa
nies to secure tax breaks an d subsi
dies th at may u n d e rc u t th e b e n e 
fits o f relocation for th e com m uni
ties involved.
T here are a n u m b er o f im por
tant activities th at local govern
m ents—in d ep en d en tly o r in con
ju n c tio n with nation al o r regional
Hemisphere • Volume Eight, N um ber Two
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In an example of local initiative, the Municipality of Asuncion is involved in a joint
venture with the private sector to redevelop the city’s waterfront.

governm ents— can initiate to
en co u rag e an d su pport small busi
ness enterprises. Probably the sin
gle m ost im p o rtan t step is im prov
ing access to the credit th at small
businesses n eed to start up and
ex p an d th eir operations. In the
US, this co n cern has led to the cre
ation o f various kinds o f govern
m en t credit assistance program s at
b o th the state an d local level, espe
cially in larg er cities like Chicago
20 Hemisphere • Volume Eight, Num ber Two

and Miami. Such program s have
b een successful in m any com m uni
ties.
C redit is an even g reater con
cern for small businesses in Latin
A m erica than it is in the US, due
to the traditional restrictiveness of
Latin A m erican banking an d credit
practices. Since the mid-1980s, the
IDB has created various financial
institutions to m ake loans available
to small and m edium -sized busi

nesses in the region. O n e exam ple
is the Inter-A m erican Investm ent
C orporation, which has m ade over
1,000 loans since 1989. T he IDB
has also en co u rag ed individual
countries to establish financial
institutions responsive to th e needs
o f small en tre p ren e u rs. Perhaps
the m ost successful exp erien ce in
this regard is Banco Sol in Bolivia.
C reated as a n o n p ro fit organiza
tion in 1985 (and originally known
as the F und for P rom otion and
D evelopm ent o f M icro-E nterprise),
Banco Sol was c h a rtere d as a com 
m ercial bank in 1992 with a mis
sion to lend to small businesses.
This strategy has proven to be b oth
profitable an d productive; since
going com m ercial, Banco Sol has
m ade over 71,000 individual loans,
averaging $660 each. Over 70% o f
its custom ers are wom en. W ithout
question, w hether w orking in d e
pen d en tly o r in conju n ctio n with
private o r n o n p ro fit organizations,
Latin A m erica’s larger an d m id
sized cities should m ake a greater
effort to m ake cred it available to
su p p o rt the grow th o f small busi
nesses.
A n o th er crucial area o f su p p o rt
is providing small businesses with
technical assistance, especially with
regard to such activities as p ro p e r
accounting procedures, m arketing
and m arket research, an d p ro d u ct
distribution techniques. A success
ful exam ple o f such efforts is the
small business in cu b ato r program
in P orto Alegre, Brazil, which
exists th ro u g h a public-private
partnership.
Local governm ents can u n d e r
take a variety o f o th e r activities to
encourage the developm ent o f
small businesses and, consequently,
em ploym ent o p p o rtu n ities within
th eir com m unities. In La Paz,
Bolivia, fo rm er Mayor Ronald
M cLean w orked to red u ce cu m b er
som e m unicipal regulations and
fees, thereby creating a tax an d
regulatory environm en t favorable
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to small business developm ent.
A nother im p o rtan t and increasingly
com m on strategy involves the cre
ation o f new m unicipal structures
to facilitate long-term econom ic
developm ent. Such efforts, which
are already underw ay in Cali,
Colom bia and several U ruguayan
cities, can help identify particular
m arket niches and potential areas
for futu re developm ent. Still
an o th er useful strategy involves ori
en ting local purchasing practices
toward local vendors and p roduc
ers.
Increasingly, Latin Am erican
m unicipalities are turn in g to strate
gic public-private partnerships as
vehicles for local econom ic devel
o p m en t and jo b creation. In
Asuncion, Paraguay, Mayor M artin
B urt has launched an initiative to
use local com m unity centers for jo b
training activities in cooperation
with the N ational University of
Asuncion. A n o th er B urt effort—
first initiated by his predecessor,
Carlos Filizzola, and encouraged by
a US Agency for International
D evelopm ent local governance pro
je c t—involves a jo in t venture
betw een the M unicipality of
A suncion and the private sector to
redevelop the city’s w aterfront.
This project will add 1,700 acres of
w aterfront land and generate a
wide variety o f new tourist and com 
m ercial activities.
C o n c l u s io n

Issues o f local governance are
becom ing a growing concern in
Latin Am erica as recognition
spreads o f th eir im portance to
dem ocracy and developm ent.
Increasingly, however, this new fron
tier o f dem ocracy is also becom ing
a fro n tier o f effective public service.
M otivated by the realities o f grow
ing electoral accountability, en e r
getic and com m itted local officials
are taking on new an d m ore signifi
cant responsibilities. Increasingly,
th eir efforts have concentrated on

econom ic developm ent and jo b
generation.
Like their N orth A m erican coun
terparts several decades ago, Latin
A m erica’s m unicipal officials are
realizing that successful econom ic
developm ent and jo b creation ini
tiatives can have positive political
consequences. As a result, the
h em isp h ere’s m ore creative and
politically astute local officials view
econom ic developm ent and jo b cre
ation as im portant elem ents on the
m unicipal agenda. W ith the assis
tance o f the international aid com 
munity, they have worked to make

credit available to small en tre p re
neurs. O th er efforts involve publicprivate collaboration, an area with
great potential for future growth.
T he prom otion o f jo b creation
through econom ic developm ent is a
new field for Latin Am erican gov
ernm ent, at all levels. As such, it
represents an opportunity for local
officials to undertake new initiatives
w ithout having to com pete with the
national governm ent. It also gives
local governm ents a chance to
dem onstrate the relevance and
im portance o f the institutions
u n d e r their control. ■
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Cleaning Up Free Trade
Janet Jarman

n 1993, opponents of the pro
posed N orth American Free
Trade A greem ent (Nafta) felt
certain that its im plem enta
tion would increase pollution
and fu rth er degrade environ
m ental conditions along the MexicoU nited States border. Already,
decades of econom ic integration
had caused rapid industrial and sub
sequent population growth. Form er
agricultural towns were transform ed
into industrial centers too quickly
for local governm ents to accommo
date growth with adequate infra
structure.
In addition, the num ber of
maquiladoras, or export plants, in
Mexico increased from 12 in 1965 to
over 2,000 in 1993, contributing to
serious air and water pollution on
both sides o f the border. During the
Nafta debate, estimates for cleaning
up the region ranged from the $6
billion predicted by the Clinton
adm inistration to a $20 billion esti
m ate by the Sierra Club.
To com bat these criticisms and get
Nafta passed, Congress created an
environm ental side agreem ent
designed to provide mechanisms for
resolving disputes over potential
transnational environm ental prob
lems. Lawmakers also incorporated
a third, parallel agreem ent with spe
cial reference to the border region.
This agreem ent called for the estab
lishm ent of two binational institu-
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Environmental Issues in Latin America
froyii the University of Lon don. Her
photo essay exploring the plight of one
Mexican migrant family in the US will
appear in the next issue of Hemisphere.
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tions, the B order Environm ent
C ooperation Commission (BECC)
and the N orth American
Developm ent Bank (NADBank).
These institutions were designed to
facilitate and fund border cleanup
and infrastructure projects, acting as
a type o f “social contract” to coun
teract the possible negative effects of
free trade. T heir potential to do so
has been an ongoing debate
between pro- and anti-Nafta groups
in the U nited States. Both organiza
tions have been subject to sustained
criticism since their inceptions, espe
cially from NGOs, but also from
local Mexican officials and residents.
Should they fail, free trade advocates
in Congress could feel m ore confi
dent of excluding environm ental
clauses from future agreements.
F orm ula

has

F laws

BECC works with various levels of
governm ent, local com m unities and
NGOs on both sides o f the border,
assisting them in developing envi
ronm ental im provem ent projects.
NADBank provides financial pack
ages for these projects. Although
this form ula seems straightforward,
both institutions have been less effi
cient than predicted, albeit some
times for reasons out of their con
trol. Most grievances fit into three
categories: affordability, speed/effi
ciency and public involvement.
For instance, critics argue that the
low-income com m unities most in
need o f basic environm ental services
cannot afford loans under
NADBank’s conditions. Also costly
and time-consuming are the rigor
ous engineering studies required by
the BECC application—a two-stage,
arduous process. According to
Mexican residents and officials, it

takes less time to obtain infrastruc
ture through existing m ethods—
either by waiting for governm ent
grants to trickle down to municipali
ties or through a m uch m ore rapid
system based on political patronage.
L o n g -T e r m S o l u t i o n s N

eeded

Strapped by debts incurred in the
1980s and exacerbated in the 1990s,
the Mexican governm ent lacks funds
to support the country’s endless
num ber of backlogged infrastruc
ture projects. Despite President
Zedillo’s election promises to decen
tralize governm ent, giving m ore
power to municipalities, mayors lack
the resources to accom m odate
growth. As a result, officials are
forced to im plem ent short-term
solutions to long-term problems.
BECC and NADBank aim to
change this system. T heir overarch
ing goal is to supplant existing
mechanisms for obtaining infrastruc
ture by encouraging bo rd er resi
dents and officials to adopt a long
term approach to environm ental
m anagem ent. T heir prim ary finan
cial goal is to help bo rd er com m uni
ties achieve a gradual transition
from a limited num ber o f subsidized
ventures to projects financed by bor
rowing—either from banks or from
the capital markets. T heir prim ary
social objective is to prom ote public
participation, transparency and
broader com m unity involvement in
decision making.
T ale

of

O n e C it y

O ne revealing example of
BECC/NADBank program s in prac
tice is the industrial border city of
Matamoros. Located ju st below
Brownsville, Texas, M atamoros hous
es three times the residents and

Collecting water from a public tap in the colonia ofNueva Era, in the border city of Nuevo Laredo. Residents complain that water
there is of poor quality and supplies are erratic. Service was particularly poor during a severe regional drought during the summer of
1996. Photo: Janet Jarman.
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Trash pickers converge on a load of garbage deposited in the Matamoros municipal dump. Thirty to fifty families work in the dump
on a regidar basis, creating an informal market fo r metal, tin, glass and other recyclable items. The dump is especially grueling dur
ing the summer and when large fires set to burn the garbage create noxious fumes. Other hazards include sharp objects, disease vec
tors and high levels of dust. Photo: Janet Jarman.

W hy N

ot

M ore C orpo rate

R e s p o n s ib il it y ?

Ultimately, Sampayo wonders why
BECC and NADBank were created
when the logical responsibility for
b order cleanup should lie with the
Mexican and foreign industries that
operate in the area. Fifteen of the
city’s 100 m aquiladoras are Fortune
500 companies, but they do little to
enhance infrastructure. Instead,
they enjoy their tax-free status and
contribute minimally to Matamoros
charities. At the very least, environ
mentalists and fair trade advocates
argue, com panies should pay work
ers enough to afford basic services
that would reduce environm ental
hazards in their im m ediate sur
roundings.
26 Hemisphere • Volume Eight, N um ber Two

In one of the m ost controversial
BECC/NADBank projects to date,
FINSA, a private industrial park,
requested a loan to upgrade one of
its water treatm ent plants to m eet
Mexican environm ental standards.
By charter, NADBank is perm itted to
provide assistance to private entities.
Yet, upon certification of the FINSA
project, even the bank’s main spon
sor in the US Congress, Esteban
Torres, said that FINSA represented
the “wrong type” of private project.
In his words, “the FINSA project
provided a clear example o f the pri
vate sector taking advantage o f p u b 
lic funds to enhance their own oper
ations.” O ther allegations by envi
ronm ental and policy groups in
Texas stated that FINSA and BECC

never adequately engaged the public
before certifying the project.
The FINSA controversy brought
about two fundam ental changes in
BECC policy. The first sought to
ensure com m unity participation by
obligating BECC to publish a list of
all projects u n d er consideration at
least 45 days prior to upcom ing pub
lic meetings. A second and less
straigh tforward ruling required all
“private only” projects to provide
some type o f “com m unity benefit.”
FINSA’s response to this require
m ent was a reluctant agreem ent
to contribute $50,000 (5% of
NADBank’s loan guarantee) of “inkind” engineering services for infra
structure studies in neighboring
colonias. FINSA m ade this promise
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in January 1996, but as o f August
1997 colonia residents had seen no
concrete studies.
At the time, FINSA representative
F ernando Paulin Delgado gave sev
eral explanations for the park’s fail
ure to m eet its com m unity obliga
tions. Among them , he cited “obsta
cles and red tap e” created by BECC
and NADBank. “We want to finish
the study, but the NADBank refuses
to give us o ur loan,” he said. “How
can we help the com m unity if the
NADBank d oesn’t give us our loan?”
Technically, though, NADBank
never prom ised FINSA a loan—only
a loan “guarantee” equal to half the
am ount of the $1 million needed to
build the treatm ent plant. FINSA
utilized a short-term loan from
ano th er Texas bank to pay for the
plant, constructed by Mexican engi
neering firm BIMEXSA. FINSA
may someday n eed NADBank’s guar
antee to repay this loan; until then,
however, the bank cannot force
FINSA to fulfill its promise to the
community. “W hen the borrow er is
ready to borrow, we’ll give them the
loan,” explained the bank’s general
manager, Victor Miramontes. “But if
the deal never closes, we have no
obligations.”
According to a NADBank
spokesperson, FINSA and BIMEXSA
recently approached the bank about
the loan. The guarantee is held up
in the bank's internal approval
process while officials do due dili
gence on the borrowers. It is still
unclear w hether NADBank will ever
issue the guarantee.
Many colonia residents feel disillu
sioned and betrayed. “We thought
we deserved the studies from FINSA,
but they broke their prom ise,” said
one colonia president, Margarita
Murillo. W ithout FINSA’s support,
Murillo m ust retu rn to traditional
m ethods of obtaining infrastructure
in h er com m unity—through local
and state governm ent bureaucracy
and infinite trips to City Hall. She
and o th er colonia residents gave up

on the BECC/NADBank process
long ago. For them , the institutions
seemed like distant entities far
removed from the everyday realities
o f low-income border communities.
T h e P r ic e

of

M o d e r n iz a t io n

The experiences of officials and
residents of M atamoros illustrate
some inherent contradictions and
potential pitfalls o f the BECC/
NADBank process. Since its incep
tion, BECC has reviewed over 100
project outlines and certified 19.
NADBank has approved financing
packages for four projects, but has
actually financed only two. This
is due in part to the fact that
NADBank was never intended to be
a prim ary lender. Its first objective
is to solicit and coordinate funding
from other sources. Should the
bank choose to be a lender itself, it
can provide only 50% o f the value of
any project. As a result, many pro
jects becom e stalled as sponsors seek
the rem aining 50% financing or as
com m unities negotiate rate-fee
structures designed to cover debt
servicing.
BECC and NADBank officials
defend the organizations’ track
record. “W hat they [critics] d o n 't
want to adm it,” says BECC general
m anager Javier Cabrera, “is that this
is the price of democracy ... It
requires a lot m ore effort and m en
tal investm ent since you have to sell
ideas, discuss them , and have argu
ments to convince people at all dif
ferent levels.” He adds that in the
past, many Mexican com m unities
depended on subsidies. “This is the
traditional way,” he says, “but now
we have opened up our economy,
and we have to m odernize. O ne of
the ways to do this is to recuperate
costs, and Mexicans are not used to
this.”
This is no t to say that BECC and
NADBank officials d o n ’t understand
the controversial nature o f im posing
fees for the first time or of raising
existing rates for new projects. Both

institutions have established innova
tive technical assistance program s
aim ed at helping cities achieve
sm ooth transitions to the new
model. In particular, BECC has suc
ceeded in prom oting a m ore trans
parent and participatory approach
to decision m aking in Mexico.
According to Domingo Gonzales, an
outspoken Mexican environm ental
ist, BECC has opened the process of
what he calls “Mexican wheelerdealerism ” to public scrutiny.
Nevertheless, Gonzales and other
skeptics doubt that the institutions
can transform the bord er region.
After observing the Mexican system
for years, Gonzales believes that the
NADBank’s assumption that envi
ronm ental infrastructure in Mexico
can be decided upon and financed
the way it is in the U nited States
shows a poor understanding o f the
nature of Mexican governm ent. In
his opinion, Mexico’s centralized
power structure almost guarantees
the failure of the application
process.
Furtherm ore, neither BECC nor
NADBank has enforcem ent powers
aside from public pressure.
According to Congressman Torres,
this is because they are not part of
Nafta’s core. “Future environm ental
clauses m ust be integrated into the
m ain body o f the agreem ent,” he
argues. “W ithout these powers, no
agreem ent can effectively address
environm ental or labor conse
quences o f free trade.”
On a m ore discouraging note, it is
unlikely that BECC or NADBank will
influence the inclusion of environ
m ental clauses in future free trade
agreem ents. The US Congress
recently rejected President C linton’s
efforts to gain “fast-track” authority
over such agreem ents, due in part to
the ongoing debate over controver
sial issues such as labor and the envi
ronm ent. These issues will likely
come back to haunt the negotiation
process for a hem ispheric Free
Trade Area of the Americas. ■
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The Left as Arbiter
Osman Morales Roca

n August 6, 1997, for
protests by labor unions, peasants,
m er military dictator
teachers and students, has played a
General Hugo Banzer
role in determ ining the course of
Suarez became
reform in Bolivia. However, this
Bolivia’s fifth constitu
influence has not extended to any
tional president since
real modification o f the reform
the country returned to democratic
process in such key areas as privatiza
rule in 1982. With a plurality of only
tion and decentralization of
21%, Banzer’s rightist political party,
resources.
Accion Democratica Nacionalista
(ADN), was forced into an unlikely
T h e O r ig in s o f R e f o r m
coalition with populist parties such as
In the decades following the
U nidad Civica Solidaridad (UCS)
Bolivian National Revolution of 1952,
and Conciencia de Patria (C ondepa),
Bolivia—like most o f Latin
as well as Bolivia’s main leftist party,
America—followed a statist m odel of
the Movimiento de Izquierda
development. After the debt crisis of
Revolucionaria (MIR). These dis
the early 1980s, however, govern
parate allies pledged to m aintain the
ments throughout the region recog
neoliberal model innoduced by
nized the need for drastic economic
President Victor Paz Estenssoro
measures. W hen Paz Estenssoro took
(1985-1989) and expanded on by his
office in 1985, he em barked on a
successors: Jaim e Paz Zamora (1989major overhaul of economic strategy.
1993) and Gonzalo Sanchez de
His main goals were to stabilize the
Lozada (1993-1997).
exchange rate, liberalize trade and
Banzer and his coalition partners
capital accounts, reduce the public
make for strange bedfellows, but they
deficit, halt hyperinflation and
seem poised to continue a trend that
improve the country’s relationship
has characterized neoliberalism and
with international credit organiza
its im plem entation in Bolivia. In this
tions. By the end of his term in
highly politicized country with a
1989, most of these goals had been
strong revolutionary heritage, leftist
met, and in the last decade Bolivia
and populist parties have em erged as
has enjoyed economic stability, low
a force in reshaping neoliberal
inflation rates and manageable bud
reform. Given their im portance in
get deficits and debt services.
coalition-building, these parties have
In light of this success, successive
used political leverage to gain conces
presidents retained most features of
sions and patronage posts from the
Paz Estenssoro’s economic plan.
government. Their advocacy of a
However, im plem entation of these
com ponent of social justice on the
policies m et with many hurdles, both
neoliberal agenda, com bined with
internal and external. With its small
private sector, scarce domestic savings
and low levels of foreign investment,
Osman Morales Roca is a Ph.D candi
Bolivia relies on massive external
date in political science and a member of
financing from sources such as the
the research staff at the Bildner Center
IMF and World Bank. Such depen
for Western Hemisphere Studies, City
dency is the Achilles’ heel of the
University of New York.
Bolivian economy, since foreign
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lenders, especially the United States,
impose many conditions in return
for aid. Well into his first year in
office, Sanchez de Lozada declared,
“The IMF comes, the World Bank
comes, the US ambassador comes, all
to tell us what to do.”
Bolivia also faces internal chal
lenges to neoliberalism: most im por
tant, an extremely politicized civil
society. Labor, political parties and
regional civic committees are outspo
ken critics of governm ent policy,
which they claim has only deepened
existing inequalities in Bolivian soci
ety. Neglecting the social aspects of
neoliberalism could thus pose a seri
ous threat to m acroeconomic stability
and democracy in Bolivia.
T h e B o l iv ia n M o d e l : C a pit a liz a t io n
and

P o p u l a r P a r t ic ip a t io n

Given Bolivia’s internal socioeco
nomic and political context, pure
neoliberalism is no t a feasible option
for governments hoping to stay in
power. Sanchez de Lozada gave the
policy a new twist, com bining statist
structures with newer economic m od
els. In an astute balancing act, he
applied market-based policies (espe
cially privatization and macroeco
nomic m anagem ent) to appease the
nation’s external creditors, while
m aintaining statist structures to satis
fy internal dem ands for social justice.
He structured his reform program
around two basic elements designed
to m eet this double goal: capitaliza
tion, a variant of privatization intend
ed to achieve sustained economic
growth by attracting foreign invest
m ent and private sector involvement;
and popular participation, an
attem pt to democratize the political
system by redistributing political
power and economic resources to
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Implementing neoliberal reform in Bolivia

Bolivia’s capitalization program originally included a $250 annual pension fo r the
country’s senior citizens. General Hugo Banzer’s government eliminated this program,
known as the Bonosol. Photo: Felipe Sanguines.

states and municipalities. While
these measures were designed to fur
ther the neoliberal model, they also
contained structuralist elements that
kept the state involved in key areas of
the economy, politics and society.
Bolivia is perhaps the most anti
neoliberal country in the hemi
sphere. All sectors of civil society and
the political elite have, at least since
1952, been nurtured by the state

through public employm ent and
political patronage, and are under
standably loath to relinquish their
privileges. Sanchez de Lozada’s first
task was to design a model of privati
zation that would be palatable to
these entrenched interests. U nder his
plan, m anagem ent control and 50%
of key state enterprises—telecomm u
nications, electricity, airlines, rail
roads, oil and gas, and the tin and

antimony smelter and refining com
plex (ENAF)—were transferred to
private foreign capital. The other
50% of shares rem ained in Bolivian
hands, in the form of a privately
managed pension fund that distrib
uted about $250 annually to the
country’s senior citizens. The first
distribution was carried out in May
1997; foreign investors did not pay
the Bolivian governm ent for their
50% shares, but instead invested the
value in increasing the com panies’
capital.
Popular participation was another
aspect of Sanchez de Lozada’s
attem pt to im plem ent a form of
neoliberalism acceptable to his social
critics. This program increased local
autonomy by redistributing 20% of
central funds to Bolivia’s municipali
ties, provinces and departm ents,
according to their population. It
reversed the traditional flow of
resources from the provinces to the
center and effected a redistribution
of functions, making local govern
ments responsible for social services
such as health care, education and
housing. This new autonom y was
especially im portant for indigenous
communities and the poorest regions
of the country, and ensured that
funds were handled in a m ore trans
parent fashion. Decentralization
thus enhanced political participation
and democracy while legitimizing a
system condem ned for producing
inequality.
Intern a l

and

E x t e r n a l C o n s t r a in t s

Considering the strength of anti
neoliberal sentim ent in Bolivia, the
slow pace o f reform should come as
no surprise. Sanchez de Lozada had
to balance external and internal
dem ands in order to maintain his
Hemisphere • Volume Eight, N um ber Two
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Riding the neoliberal train: Bolivia’s state-owned railroad company, ENFE, was capitalized in 1995 after bitter labor and bidding
disputes. Photo: Felipe Sanguines.

adm inistration’s credibility both at
hom e and abroad. By paying atten
tion to social concerns, he attem pted
to hum anize the neoliberal model.
At the same time, he carefully m an
aged m acroeconomic indicators and
privatized major state enterprises.
All of Sanchez de Lozada’s reforms
m et with serious opposition in the
form of protests by peasants, workers,
students and teachers. Nationalists
opposed the capitalization of strate
gic state enterprises such as the state
airline, Lloyd Aereo Boliviano; the
petroleum company, Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos
(YPFB); and the state-owned railroad.
In light of the century-plus dispute
30 Hemisphere • Volume Eight, Num ber Two

between Bolivia and Chile concern
ing access to the Pacific coast, these
critics were particularly incensed
when the railroads were sold to
Chilean private enterprises.
Labor unions denounced capital
ization, calling it a scheme for ceding
key state enterprises to foreign
investors, and state employees feared
the policy would result in layoffs.
Miners, historically an im portant
political force in Bolivia, protested
the privatization of state-owned min
eral deposits, while teachers and uni
versity students opposed educational
reform. At the same time, civic com
mittees urged greater regional auton
omy than that granted by popular

participation, pressing for direct elec
tion of departm ental authorities.
Some departm ents, such as Tarija
and Santa Cruz, went so far as threat
ening to secede.
Despite such opposition, Sanchez
de Lozada managed to achieve major
progress in his reform agenda. By
mid-1997, five of the six major state
enterprises, as well as 49 smaller
ones, had successfully been capital
ized, bringing in roughly $1.8 billion.
Some enterprises, such as the state
telephone company (Entel), attract
ed m ore revenue than anticipated.
Layoffs were mostly averted, and the
governm ent granted certain opposi
tion demands, such as allowing

Special Feature: Privatization

Entel’s employees to buy shares in
the company. In a major coup,
Sanchez de Lozada also attracted for
eign investment for YPFB exploration
and developm ent projects. With the
aid of m ore than $2 billion from
multilateral institutions, the company
has started construction of a 3,000
kilometer natural gas pipeline to
Brazil.
And yet, while Bolivia’s reform pro
gram has resulted in some notable
successes, less promising economic
indicators persist. Since 1987, the
ratio of investment to GDP has hov
ered between 5% and 6%, low even
by Latin American standards. The
country’s reliance on mining
(accounting for almost half of
exports) and natural gas leaves the
economy d ependent on prim ary
products, which are vulnerable to
swings in international m arket prices.
High unem ploym ent, unequal
incom e distribution and outright
poverty rem ain im portant problems
for Bolivia, whose per capita annual
incom e of $650 is the lowest in South
America. The U nited Nations’
H um an Development Index—a rat
ing that combines indicators of real
purchasing power, education and
health—consistently ranks the coun
try towards the bottom o f the list for
Latin America. Bolivia also depends
on US approval to continue borrow
ing from multilateral institutions,
which account for most of the coun
try’s foreign debt.
Politically, the coast is also far from
clear. If they persist, protests against
the reform packages could further
destabilize Bolivia’s notoriously
volatile political system. Despite suc
cessful negotiations and concessions
made by both the governm ent and
protesters, political instability looms
large. Unless the reforms yield
immediate positive results, the
nation’s political system may once
again become chaotic.
On a m ore positive note, Bolivia’s
dem ocratic system is stronger now
and has changed the way that struc

tural reforms are debated and car
ried into law. W hen Paz Estenssoro
introduced neoliberalism, he did it
by authoritarian means. U nder
Sanchez de Lozada, however, struc
tural reforms were subject to a dem o
cratic process that both slowed and
legitimated their execution. Every
item was challenged, debated and
negotiated, enabling the president to
gain crucial support from parties that
could normally be expected to
oppose neoliberalism. Sanchez de
Lozada sought alliances with Victor
Hugo Cardenas, leader of the indige
nous Movimiento Revolucionario
Tupac Katari de Liberacion
(MRTKL)—and subsequently his vice
president—as well as with the pop
ulist UCS and the leftist Movimiento
Bolivia Libre (MBL). These organi
zations, traditionally unreceptive to
m arket reforms, supported the gov
ernm ent while voicing some of the
dem ands of the electorate.
C o n c l u s io n

The state still plays a m ajor role
in the Bolivian economy; it is respon
sible for m acroeconomic m anage
m ent and infrastructure, and 60% of
all investment is concentrated in the
public sector. Likewise, a large part
of the Bolivian labor force relies on
public employment. The most bla
tant aspects of statism, such as high
tariffs and nationalization, may be
gone, but m ore subtle ones remain
and may influence the future course
of neoliberalism in Bolivia. Tradi
tional structures and institutions,
such as dependence on the state by
various sectors of civil society—
including labor for subsidies and wel
fare, business for protections and
incentives, and political elites for
patronage—will not vanish immedi
ately, regardless of external pressures
for market-oriented reforms.
Just as state regulation interferes
with the market, so does m arket logic
interfere with political and, especial
ly, social goals. Sanchez de Lozada
did not blindly pursue neoliberal

reforms. Faced with opposition from
labor and peasant organizations, as
well as other political parties, he
m odified his agenda to devote m ore
resources to social programs. Left-ofcenter parties (UCS, Condepa, MBL
and MIR) played an im portant role
in calling attention to the social costs
of neoliberalism, while facilitating
the consensus necessary for econom 
ic, political and social stability.
Popular leftist groups, given access
to power, have m anaged to block the
most extreme manifestations of
neoliberalism. In the 1997 presiden
tial elections, Sanchez de Lozada
and his coalition governm ent were
perceived as too neoliberal and were
voted out of office. Although Banzer
and the ADN won the elections, the
UCS and C ondepa were close
behind. As a result, the continued
role of populists and leftists as coali
tion partners in neoliberal govern
m ents promises to maintain the deli
cate balance between neoliberalism
and statism. Banzer has called for
continued im plem entation of
Sanchez de Lozada’s reform agenda,
although there are indications that
the economy is faltering. In
Decem ber 1997, in response to bud
get shortfalls, the new governm ent
launched a so-called gasolinazo that
raised fuel prices by 30%. It also
announced elimination of the
Bonosol, the annual payment of $250
to all Bolivians over 65 instituted by
Sanchez de Lozada’s administration.
Labor unrest predictably followed,
but the ruling coalition stood stead
fastly behind these unpopular m ea
sures.
On the whole, the need for eco
nomic growth seems to have m odi
fied Bolivia’s left-of-center parties,
who seem to be leaning toward the
attitude expressed by Luis Maira of
Chile’s Socialist Party: “We must
build a house with two stories. The
second story should involve social
programs, but the ground floor must
include sound macroeconom ic prin
ciples.” ■
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Democratic Constraints to Reform
Jorge Vargas-Cullell

c

osta Rica has little to
show for its experience
with privatization.
Even after three struc
tural adjustm ent loans
from the World Bank
in a little over a decade— 1985,
1989 and 1993— the Costa Rican
governm ent has im plem ented a
slow, shallow, piecem eal privatiza
tion. Most privatized institutions
once belonged to the Costa Rican
D evelopm ent C orporation
(C odesa), a public holding that
em bodied the co u ntry’s brief expe
rience with en trep ren eu rial state
strategy. A strong interventionist
state rem ains a m ajor actor in key
m arkets such as finance, power,
telecom m unications, insurance and
social security. As Sebastian
Edwards argues in his work Crisis
and Reform in Latin America, in
term s o f privatization, Costa Rica
lags far b eh in d the rest o f Latin
America.
Given its relative inexperience in
this area, Costa Rica may seem like
a spurious exam ple for a m odel of
privatization. In term s o f the com 
parative politics o f privatization,
however, the country em erges as an
im p o rtan t case. Privatization in
Costa Rica has n o t been a response
to widespread, p rolonged state fail
ure. O n the contrary, Costa Rica,
the oldest stable dem ocracy in

Jorge Vargas-Cullell is a consultant with
a Costa Rican-based European Union
and United Nations Development
Program initiative for Central America.
During the spring of 1997 he was a vis
iting fellow at the Kellogg Institute at the
University of Notre Dame. This article
is part of a larger work in progress.
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Latin America, is the only country
in Latin Am erica where the state
has im plem ented econom ic and
institutional reform s within a
m ature dem ocratic regim e. Unlike
sim ilar efforts in Chile, A rgentina
or Mexico, Costa Rican m arket
reform has confronted m ultiple
dem ocratic constraints to sweeping
policy changes. And in contrast to
Venezuela, state interventionism
and dem ocratic institutions have
no t led to econom ic and political
quagm ires. T he study o f privatiza
tion in Costa Rica, therefore, sheds
light on a basic question: How do
dem ocracies in developing coun
tries cope with m ajor policy
reforms? Addressing this concern
affords im portant insight into the
long-term survival o f dem ocracies
in countries with developing, vul
nerable economies.
Privatization in Costa Rica is also
intriguing on its own terms.
Despite appearances to the con
trary, “E pur s ’il muove,” as Galileo
pu t it. Still it turns. In the last
decade, the Costa Rican govern
m ent has im plem ented privatiza
tion in the areas o f finance, power
generation, staple foods, com m erce
and industry, with heated debate
over reform s in the power and
telecom m unications sectors.
Despite its m odest scope, however,
privatization has been at the core of
Costa Rica’s political debate on
m odernization. Following Harvey
Feigenbaum ’s and Jeffrey H en ig ’s
definition o f privatization as the
transfer of functions and activities
from the state to the private sector,
G alileo’s m axim applies: Things
move, albeit slowly, in Costa Rica.
W hat then accounts for the slow
pace o f privatization in Costa Rica?

T he m ost convincing explanation is
that dem ocratic constraints, as well
as linkages between the state and
political parties, lim it the govern
m e n t’s ability to im plem ent sweep
ing institutional reform s. Since
many actors hold veto power, the
process o f coalition-building is
inclusive and collusive. Costa Rica
is undergoing a process o f alliance
transform ation, allowing reform ers
prom oting privatization to collude
with institutional actors who hold
veto powers. This process has
allowed the governm ent to im ple
m ent a lim ited privatization p ro 
gram; yet the com plex n atu re of
such negotiations renders sweeping
reform s unfeasible.
T h e C o s t a R ic a n E x p e r ie n c e

C om pared to Chile, A rgentina
and Mexico, privatization in Costa
Rica has been minim al. In the first
three countries, governm ents trans
ferred entire sectors to the private
sphere through am bitious public
divestiture program s. M odern
ization o f the state was at the heart
of m arket-oriented reform s
designed to replace state-led devel
opm ent. In contrast, although
Costa Rica was one o f the first Latin
Am erican countries to receive a
World Bank structural adjustm ent
loan, privatization th ere has not
proceeded as rapidly as elsewhere
in the region.
In the 1980s, successive Costa
Rican adm inistrations im plem ented
a gradual, piecem eal process o f pri
vatization. This process has been
characterized by exten d ed lags
between the decision to privatize
and actual im plem entation.
Moreover, privatization has been
im plem ented on a case by case
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The slow pace of privatization in Costa Rica

Oil is a sensitive issue fo r any country contemplating privatization. Costa R ica’s refineries remain under the control o f the stateowned oil company, Recope.

basis, with divestiture, as a rule, not
the p referred approach. Instead,
the governm ent has chosen gradu
ally to lower en try barriers to m ar
kets previously m onopolized by the
public sector, leading private com 
panies to devise new m arket condi
tions to com pete with existing p u b 
lic firms. These trends hold tru e for
three o f the m ain areas of the Costa
Rican econom y exposed to privati
zation: finance, power and tele
com m unications.

T h e F in a n c ia l S e c t o r

From 1980 to 1997, Costa Rica fol
lowed a steady policy of m arket lib
eralization. A series o f laws passed
to fu rth er this goal included provi
sions to allow private banks access to
state funds; the form ulation of a
state regulatory framework over
public and private banks; and new
guidelines for the dom estic capital
m arket. Finally, in Novem ber 1995,
Congress abolished what rem ained
o f the state m onopoly over savings

and checking accounts— the linch
pin of state-led developm ent from
1950 to 1980. T he legislature then
created a new legal fram ework for
the financial sector, redefining the
central bank’s functions and rein
forcing the state’s regulatory capa
bilities.
Costa Rica’s financial sector is
presently undergoing an accelerated
transition to private ownership and
global integration. Following strong
m arket expansion during the 1980s,
Hemisphere
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private banks took the lead in sup
plying credit; between January and
May 1995, they accounted for 51.9%
o f the country’s total loan portfolio.
In the 1980s, the U nited States
Agency for International Develop
m ent (USAID) actively supported
the expansion o f private banks by
exerting pressure on Costa Rica to
lower barriers to private competi
tion. At the same dm e, the agency
advocated a strong financial pro
gram to aid fledgling private banks.
USAID funds subsidized these oper
ations by supplying low-cost capital,
allowing for unusually large financial
spreads. During this period, the
state relinquished control over the
stock exchange, which was founded
in 1976. New financial operators—
including private pension adminis
trators, leasing and factoring firms—
also came on the scene. In 1997,
the m ain private banks launched vig
orous m erger processes and public
banks inched toward institutional
restructuring.
E l e c t r ic it y

and

T e l e c o m m u n ic a t io n s

Since its founding in 1949, Costa
Rica’s state electricity company, the
Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), has retained a quasimo
nopoly over the power generation
sector. It has done a remarkably
thorough job; in 1990, the num ber
of Costa Rican hom es with electricity
exceeded 90%. Small regional utili
ty com panies—usually cooperatives
or community-based firms—have
continued to operate independently,
but ICE and ICE-owned companies
produce, transm it and distribute
over 95% of the n ation’s energy supply.
T he state began encouraging pri
vate investm ent in the power sector
in the early 1990s. New laws allowed
private firms to generate an initial
15% o f the country’s energy supply,
a level that soon rose to 30%. The
same legislation required ICE to buy
the power generated by private com
34 Hemisphere
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Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America where the state
has implemented economic and institutional reforms within a
mature democratic regime. The study of privatization in Costa
Rica, therefore, sheds light on a basic question: How do democ
racies in developing countries cope with major policy reforms?
panies, even if state reserves were
full.
In the last five years, ICE has
authorized the construction of over
15 power plants, with nearly 20 new
projects pending. In the m eantim e,
private investors, including the
nation’s leading political families,
have poured m oney into the power
generation sector and form ed a rival
company, Empresas de Cogeneracion Electrica. In 1996, Congress
began debating a bill that would
restructure the power sector and
create a new regulatory framework,
opening the m arket to private com
petition. However, due to a variety
of factors—opposition from ICE
trade unions and other civil organi
zations, divisions within the govern
ing Partido Liberacion Nacional
(PLN), lackluster approval ratings
for President Jose Maria Figueres
and weak opposition support— the
bill never m ade it to the voting
stage.
Besides its dom inance o f the
power generation sector, ICE also
enjoys a m onopoly over telecom m u
nications. Congress granted it a
m andate to develop this sector in
the 1960s, although private com pa
nies rem ained in the m arket until
ICE acquired Radiografica
Costarricense Sociedad Anonim a
(Racsa) in 1973. ICE showed signs
o f loosening its m onopoly in 1988,
when the com pany’s board o f direc
tors authorized Millicom, a private
firm, to develop the cellular phone
m arket through leasing. After m uch
legal wrangling, however, the deal
was nullified in 1995 by the
Suprem e Court, and ICE took back

direct operation o f the market.
Debate on a m easure to restructure
telecom m unications—effectively
ending ICE’s m onopoly—has come
to a standstill. This bill would have
created a new regulatory framework
and opened the m arket to private
investors. T he Figueres adm inistra
tion has ruled out state divestiture
for this branch of ICE, although it
has suggested selling subsidiary com
panies (including Racsa) and leasing
out radio frequencies.
E l im in a t in g C o d e s a

Codesa’s privatization was the sin
gle most im portant divestiture pro
gram in Costa Rica. Starting in
1985, the governm ent sold all of the
corporation’s subsidiaries. This was
a comparatively easy task; given
Codesa’s financial losses and its sub
sidiaries’ lackluster perform ances,
no political actors stepped forward
to oppose divestiture. Over a nineyear period, 11 subsidiaries either
folded or were sold. While some
firms, such as the Central Azucarera
del Tempisque (Catsa), were sold to
cooperatives, others—Aluminios
Nacionales (Alunasa) and
Fertilizantes de C entroam erica
(Fertica)—were sold to private
firms. Osvaldo D uran asserts that in
all cases the selling price was well
below the book value set by the
national comptroller. Finally, in
1996, Congress passed a law closing
down Codesa.
USAID funded Codesa’s divesti
ture programs. In 1985, the agency
donated $160 million to a trust
fund, nam ing Financiera de
Inversiones Transitorias as fiduciary.
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This entity was responsible for
arranging the purchase and sale to
the private sector of Codesa’s sub
sidiaries.
T h e L im it s

of

R efo rm

Despite success stories like Codesa,
Costa Rica’s ambitious privatization
program faces a double bind. On
the one hand, constraints on institu
tional reform s rule out privatization
a la Chile or Mexico. Costa Rica is a
presidential democracy with a strong
executive branch; in term s o f policy
m aking and patronage, the presi
d en t wields great political clout.
Nevertheless, the regime has an
effective system o f checks and bal
ances which limits presidential
power. In this sense, Costa Rica fits
Matthew S hubert’s concept of a
“dem ocratic regim e with multiple
vetoers.” O n the o ther hand, the
kinship between political parties and
the state—the crux of the Costa
Rican political system—creates high
political and institutional stakes for
privatization. Such relationships
have strengthened institutionallybased party actors vis-a-vis noninstitutional actors—and especially
party organizations— to the extent
that deep privatization could disrupt
the party system.
The very state/p arty linkages that
slow privatization may explain how
Costa Rica’s democracy gradually
processes reform . These linkages
have led to the creation o f biparti
san networks of “politico-entrepren eurs,” the origins of which may be
traced to the flourishing o f the inter
ventionist state in the 1960s and
1970s. These ties have allowed polit
ical parties and the entrepreneurial
sector to develop fluid working rela
tionships. Historically close ties
am ong a diverse host o f political
actors provide a framework for
im plem enting gradual privatization
with low levels o f conflict.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, sev
eral authors called attention to the
p h enom enon o f politico-entrepre-

neurs, most of whom belonged to the
PLN: the party that has dom inated
Costa Rican politics since 1951. This
group of politicians turned entrepre
neurs actively prom oted Codesa’s
expansion, sparking conflict with pri
vate industrialists. Politicians from
the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana
(PUSC), a coalition of opposition
parties form ed in 1982, later joined
these cliques. Unlike other business
m en—who typically em erge from the
middle classes, then become politi
cians—politico-ennepreneurs went
the reverse route. Their power was
rooted in the institutional structure
of the state.
The consolidation o f a bipartisan
party system after 1982 and the
structural adjustm ent process that
followed helped forge a fluid rela
tionship between the political and
entrepreneurial sectors. Old antago
nisms between the PLN and the pri
vate sector ceased, and both parties
included prom inent entrepreneurs
as cabinet m em bers during their
times in office. These groups
becam e deeply involved in policy
making, developing close ties with
politicians.
The financial sector is a good
exam ple of these linkages. Carlos
Sojo argues that in Costa Rica, “los
nombres de la politica no son nombres de
empresa”; i.e., there is a clear separa
tion between politicians and entre
preneurs. Although this assertion
may hold true for the banking sys
tem, one m ust acknowledge that
prom inent bankers are often politi
cal insiders. Well-known figures in
the world o f finance such as Luis
Lieberm an (Banco Interfin),
B ernardo Baruch (BCT), Rodolfo
Jim enez Borbon and Jorge Sanchez
(Banco Banex) carry their own
political clout. In the past 20 years,
these figures have served in key pub
lic posts u n d er both parties. Baruch
served as vice m inister of the trea
sury during the Carazo adm inistra
tion (1978-1982); Sanchez was minis
ter of economy and industry under

O duber (1974-1978); Jim enez was
President C alderon’s top adviser
(1990-1994); and Lieberm an cur
rently serves on ICE’s board of
directors.
In his analysis o f financial liberal
ization in the early 1980s, Bruce
Wilson argues that in Costa Rica, the
shift from intervention to m arket
reform s “may be accounted for by
the form ation of new coalitions with
in the governm ent party and their
inform al coalitions with nongovern
m ental groups, both domestic and
international.” He goes on to show
how realignm ents within the PLN
gradually gave the party the authori
ty to launch privatizations, an ironic
role for a political organization that
had once cham pioned nationaliza
tion of the banking system. Techno
crats and political pragmatists from
both parties m erged with a diverse
array of social and political organiza
tions to press for changes in the
existing legal framework.
C o n c l u s io n

Costa Rica clearly does not fit the
usual explanations of the politics of
privatization. While the country has
succeeded in opening up its econo
my, privatization has been a sec
ondary com ponent of m arket
reforms. T here is no protracted
struggle between rival coalitions and
opponents o f privatization to
account for such sluggish progress.
The Costa Rican governm ent has
im plem ented reform s within a con
text o f institutional stability, relative
ly low levels o f political content and
increasing com petition between par
ties with similar policy platforms. A
m ore likely explanation links the
politics of privatization with dem oc
ratic regime constraints and the his
torical relationship between political
parties and the state: a relationship
characterized by collusive negotia
tions between key political actors.
These structural and institutional
constraints determ ine the slow pace
of privatization in Costa Rica. ■
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Political Costs of Privatization
Maura Alejandra Vallejo Acevedo

fter the debt crisis of
the early 1980s, Latin
Mexico and Peru are examples of countries whose presidents
A m erica’s leaders
have adopted neoliberalism as a way to court new allies
were forced to articu
through clientelism, while closing avenues of participation to
late new econom ic
strategies to check
critics of the regime. The end result has been to reinforce cen
inflation and renew the trust of
tralist tendencies, limiting any potential progress toward
international creditors. The last
democratization.
decade has seen an intensification
of this process o f econom ic readjust
m ent, which led m ost governm ents
in the region to adopt a neoliberal
participation to critics o f the
R e f o r m in g t h e S ta t e i n P e r u : T h e
m odel o f economics. T he neoliber
regim e. T he end result has been to
I n s t it u t io n a l O u t l o o k
al m odel is based on the idea that
reinforce centralist tendencies, lim
P eru has im plem ented one o f the
through the m arket there will be a
iting any potential progress toward
m ost extensive privatization pro
massive reallocation o f resources
dem ocratization. Reforms im ple
grams in all o f Latin America. In
through different sectors and
m ented in this way may solve fiscal
ju st a few years, almost all of the
processes. T he direct intervention
crises in the short term , but the
country’s state-run com panies have
o f the state in the economy is the
absence of a broader social consen
passed into private hands. This
first logical point of discussion with
sus precludes the creation o f partici
rapid transform ation is especially
in this context.
patory m echanism s that could fur
surprising given the Peruvian state’s
Analysts of Latin America have
th er the process o f dem ocratic tran
past record o f intervention in the
ten d ed to ignore the political com
sition.
economy. In the 1960s and ‘70s,
p o n en t of econom ic readjustm ent.
This lack o f consensus has been
state-run com panies were the main
They expected econom ic reform s to
m ost obvious in the case o f privati
force behind industrialization, and a
open the political arena to new
zation, one o f the m ost im portant
bloated public sector was a useful
actors, who would in tu rn create
and controversial com ponents of
tool for defusing social protest. In
new channels o f political participa
neoliberal economics. Privatization
the 1980s, however, econom ic col
tion. From the very beginning,
brings fresh resources and allows
lapse u n d er President Alan Garcia
however, econom ic m odernization
the state to balance public finances,
and the outbreak of severe terrorist
has been a highly centralized
but it also leads to a redefinition of
violence brought about a crisis of
process, with decision m aking con
the very role o f the state. Along
legitimacy for the state. W hen
centrated in the hands o f the execu
with the econom ic effects o f this
Alberto Fujim ori took office in 1990
tive branch. Mexico and P eru are
redefinition, privatization strength
as a political outsider, he introduced
examples o f countries whose presi
ens certain political institutions—
a severe package o f econom ic
dents have adopted neoliberalism as
m ost notably, the executive
reform s to rein in hyperinflation
a way to court new allies through
branch—while socially, it eliminates
and restore the country ’s credibility
clientelism, while closing avenues of
the redistributive role o f some statewith international creditors.
owned enterprises. T he neoliberal
Privatization quickly becam e one of
agenda has tended to ignore this
Fujim ori's priorities. As o f January
Maura Alejandra Vallejo Acevedo is a
redistributive function, leaving
1997, he had raised over $6 billion
Ph.D candidate in political science at
behind the discussion of the new
through the sale of public com pa
Tulane University. She is currently
political and social responsibilities
nies to the private sector.
working on a dissertation regarding
o f the state. In this sense, the
Given the speed o f this transfor
reform of the state in Mexico, Peru and
process o f dem ocratization has also
m ation, it is easy to overlook the
Bolivia. The Mellon Foundation sup
been affected by the neoliberal eco
political and social costs of privatiza
ported the first part of this research.
nom ic agenda.
tion in Peru. The program picked

A

36 Hemisphere • Volume Eight, Number Two

An Indian woman sells corn on a muddy side street in Cuzco: Fujimori’s critics complain that the proceeds of privatization have not
addressed the root causes of poverty in Peru.
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A tentative answer to the question as to whether privatization
furthers the process of democratic transition is: no, it does not.
The revenues generated from privatization are a one-time
bonus, and unfortunately are not always used to further the
construction of democratic institutions.
up pace in 1992 after Fujim ori’s
self-styled coup, or autogolpe, which
blam ed Congress and the judicial
system for h in dering the course of
m odernization in Peru. A new con
stitution passed in 1993 strength
en ed the executive branch at their
expense, in effect m aking the presi
d en t the center o f decision making.
In this context, privatization
becam e one of the most im portant
aspects o f Fujim ori’s agenda. In
1991, his adm inistration established
the Comision para la P ro m o tio n de
la Inversion Privada (C opri), to
oversee the process. C opri’s board
is com posed of five m inistries that
decide which public enterprises will
be privatized. T h eir decisions are
later ratified by the president.
Besides this form al centralization
o f powers, Fujim ori also enhanced
his position by cultivating clientelist, o r “n eopopulist,” relation
ships outside the traditional
avenues o f political alliancebuilding. Fujimori funneled public
resources (including those gained
th ro u g h privatization) toward social
spending program s valued m ore for
th eir political symbolism than their
long-term potential to reduce
poverty. An exam ple is the state
antipoverty agency, the Fondo de
Recursos para el Desarrollo
(F oncodes). D uring Fujim ori’s
reelection cam paign in 1994, the
state p o u red over $1 billion into
Foncodes program s.
In general, privatization in P eru
has been im plem ented with an eye
toward short-term political gains.
Fujim ori has used privatization as a
panacea to cure fiscal ills and to
38 Hemisphere • Volume Eight, N um ber Two

coopt new bases o f support. The
problem is that privatization does
no t represent a p erm a n en t source
of incom e. O nce the last state com 
pany is sold to the private sector
(which C opri predicts will happen
som etim e in 1998), the well will
ru n dry.
T he centralization o f power in
P eru raises doubts about the coun
try’s political future. W here is the
Peruvian state headed after
Fujimori, given that the entire
reform process has centered on his
person? And, m ore profoundly,
how can a sustainable econom ic
m odel be built on the basis o f polit
ical expediency? P eru lacks an
institutionalized party system; politi
cal and social organizations, such as
labor unions, are weak and u n re 
sponsive, and Congress is little
m ore than a ru b b e r stamp for the
president.
D uring his State of the U nion
address in July 1995, Fujimori
acknowledged that “m odernization
can be successful only if it reaches
all m em bers o f society; this is the
only way it can be expected to last
into the fu tu re .” To live up to these
words, his adm inistration m ust
define a long-term strategy that
takes into account the redistributive
aspects o f m acroeconom ic growth.
M e x ic o : T h e P o l it ic a l
C onseq u enc es
a

of

P r iv a t iz a t io n

in

C o r p o r a t i s t S y st e m

The task o f reform ing the
Mexican state began in the mid1980s, u n d e r the leadership of
President Miguel de la M adrid. De
la M adrid took office in the midst

o f a severe econom ic crisis that
called for drastic m easures to stabi
lize public finances. His adm inis
tration took the first steps toward
neoliberal reform by weaning the
state away from nonstrategic eco
nom ic activities, such as the hotel
industry.
Despite this lim ited progress,
neoliberalism did no t take ro o t in
Mexico until Carlos Salinas de
Gortari becam e president in 1988.
T he Salinas adm inistration set out
to com plete the transition away
from im port substitution to an
outw ard-oriented m odel for eco
nom ic reform . This plan involved
forfeiting the state’s regulatory
functions to a free m arket economy.
Salinas encouraged privatization
as a key ingredient in transform ing
the paternalistic role of the
Mexican state. Between 1982 and
1993, de la M adrid and Salinas pri
vatized 977 state com panies. As in
Peru, however, privatization in
Mexico sparked trem endous con
troversy am ong en tren ch ed interest
groups. To push thro u g h the
reform s deem ed necessary for
M exico’s econom ic survival, Salinas
determ in ed to dism antle the corpo
ratist structures that for decades
had negotiated social dem ands with
the governing Institutional
R evolutionary Party (PR I).
Corporatism implies im p o rtan t
m echanism s o f representation,
cooptation and control of key social
groups, including workers, bu reau 
crats, peasants, and civil and mili
tary organizations. Since the PRI
began its reign over M exican poli
tics in 1929, the party had consult
ed these social groups when form u
lating new policies. De la M adrid
him self signed an econom ic solidar
ity pact with labor, peasant and
business organizations to legitim ate
the econom ic reform s of the 1980s.
Salinas, in contrast, was d eterm in ed
to weaken the influence o f this socalled “revolutionary family” over
econom ic policy. His conflicts with
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traditional interest groups were
reflected in the im prisonm ent of
the oil industry’s un ion leader, the
o uster o f the long-time head o f the
teachers’ union, and the defection
o f many m em bers o f the PRI to the
opposition.
Like Fujimori, Salinas sought
legitimacy th ro u g h social spending
projects intim ately associated with
his nam e. T here is still debate over
the degree to which he used privati
zation funds to finance his pet
social program , the Program a
N ational de Solidaridad. This pro
gram p o u red funds into local pro
jects such as clinics, roads and
schools in low-income areas where
the PRI lacked electoral support.
Salinas’ successor, Ernesto
Zedillo, took office in D ecem ber
1994 am id a currency crisis of
gigantic proportions. O ne of his
first actions as p resident was to
devalue the peso, and in the chaos
that followed M exico’s econom ic
reform program , whose success
seem ed assured u n d e r Salinas,
becam e far less certain. As evi
dence o f co rru p tio n and m ism an
agem ent m ounted, Salinas and
many o f his program s were discred
ited, b u t the broad outlines of
neoliberal reform rem ained. As a
result, Zedillo adopted a com plicat
ed and contradictory policy toward
corporatism . He continued to pro
m ote a free m arket economy, while
recognizing that a w eakened corporatist structure was essential for
m aintaining political and social
control. Privatization still played an
im p o rtan t role in governm ent poli
cy, b u t Zedillo favored granting
concessions for key infrastructure
projects (railroads, air- and sea
ports, electricity and telecom m uni
cations). H e justified this practice
as a m eans o f im proving productivi
ty in sectors essential for econom ic
developm ent, although critics
pointed to the n eed for a com m on
criteria for the sales and disincorporation process.

T he 1994 econom ic crisis con
vinced M exico’s leadership o f the
need to consolidate the process of
econom ic reform , despite wide
spread popular discontent. To
im pose unpopular m easures in a cli
m ate o f political uncertainty and
social mobilization, Zedillo and the
PRI have becom e ever m ore author
itarian, excluding the social sectors
affected most from the debate over
neoliberalism.
R efo rm
and

of the
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D e m o c r a t iz a t io n

Most scholars o f econom ic and
political liberalization in Latin
America view this process as part of
a sim ultaneous transition to both
free m arkets and democracy, with
one o f the first steps being the rede
finition o f the size and role o f the
state. Privatization figures into this
discussion as a key factor in reduc
ing the state apparatus.
The redefinition o f the state’s role
in the econom y is also a step toward
political transform ation. In this
context, the reform of the state has
becom e a central part of the debate
over the process o f dem ocratic tran
sition in the region. However, there
is a lack of discussion about the
political effects of econom ic poli
cies. Mexico and P eru are examples
o f states that have becom e leaner
yet stronger due to neoliberal
reform s, allowing the executive to
reassert authoritarian tendencies.
The dism antling of public enter
prises in Mexico and P eru has led to
an increasingly exclusionary deci
sion m aking process, an outcom e
that supports the thesis proposed by
Stephan Haggard and Robert
Kaufman in their book, The Politics
of Economic Adjustment. These
authors argue that the n et political
effect o f econom ic adjustm ent pack
ages is to concentrate power in the
hands o f the executive. T he main
difference between Mexico and
P eru lies in the institutional aspects
o f their respective political systems.

Fujimori faced the challenge o f cre
ating an institutional structure that
would enable the deadlocked
Peruvian state to function effective
ly; in contrast, three successive
Mexican presidents struggled with
the political consequences of eco
nom ic liberalization for the coun
try’s corporatist system.
A com parison o f Mexico and P eru
brings im portant insights into the
debate over the political effects of
privatization in Latin America, espe
cially as it concerns the construction
of dem ocratic institutions. In light
of the evidence presented above, a
tentative answer to the question as
to w hether privatization furthers the
process o f dem ocratic transition is:
no, it does not. Privatization is a
finite process that will end once all
the state-run com panies in a partic
ular country have been sold and
infrastructure projects concessioned
to the private sector. The revenues
generated from privatization are a
one-time bonus, and unfortunately
are no t always used to fu rth er the
construction of dem ocratic institu
tions. Instead, in Mexico and Peru
these funds have been exploited to
subsidize and prom ote clientelist
relationships. Program s such as
Foncodes in P eru and Pronasol in
Mexico have been presented as cor
nerstones o f social policy, whereas
they are in fact m echanism s to
coopt voters in key social or geo
graphical areas. In addition to
being tools o f political patronage,
these program s are short-term m ea
sures that have little im pact on the
larger structural problem s o f pover
ty.
In conclusion, privatization as it
has been im plem ented in Mexico
and P eru seems to support the argu
m ent that neoliberal reform in
Latin America has strengthened the
presidency at the expense o f dem oc
ratic institutions. At least in the two
countries in question, tru e reform
of the state is far from com plete; in
fact, it has barely begun. ■
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C ontem porary “Slavery” in Brazil
Photos and Text by Ricardo Funari

lave labor remains one of
the leading social calamities
of the later twentieth centu
ry. So many are the victims
and the countries that vio
late international conven
tions prohibiting slavery that the UN
has created a special group to study
contemporary forms of slavery around
the world.
Recendy, the group listed Brazil
among the few countries practicing
every form of m odern slavery, includ
ing child labor, debt bondage and the
trade in women through international
prostitution lings. The chief means of
enslavement in Brazil is debt—the
physical immobilization of workers on
estates until they pay off debts
incurred through their very working
conditions. Workers in areas affected
by recession or drought are lured into
verbal contracts and transported thou
sands of miles. Upon arrival at the
plantation or factory, the wages
promised them are forfeited to pay for
transport costs, food and tools. As
time passes, the workers’ debt grows,
making it impossible for them to pay
their way back home.
Ricardo Funari, 34, is a photograph
er in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. For the
last seven years he has collaborated
with Impact Visuals, a New York photo
agency that covers social issues around
the world. He is currently working on
a project to document contemporary
forms of slavery in Latin America,
including the exploitation of workers
in the Brazilian rainforest.
Funari can be reached in Brazil at:
tel. 55-21-265-0974, fax 55-21-556-2502,
e-mail funari@ax.apc.org. He can also
be contacted through Impact Visuals
at: tel. 212-807-6622, fax 212-807-6644,
e-mail impact@igc.apc.org. Many of
his photos are posted on his Web site:
h ttp //www.photobrazil.com. ■
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Brazil abolished slavery in 1888, but labor exploitation persists

Mute testimony of the dangers of the sisal defibering process.
Sisal is produced through an arduous defibering process. The m achinery used for this task is rudim entary and dangerous;
by some estimates, 1,500 workers have lost a finger, hand or arm in the defibering process in the state of Bahia alone.

Left: Workers load bales of sisal onto a waiting truck.
T he sisal, or agave, plant was introduced to Brazil from Mexico early in this century. It was well suited to Brazil’s arid
northeast, and the country soon becam e the w orld’s largest sisal producer. The sisal leaf produces a tough, resilient fiber
used in the thread industry and by cattle breeders to tie hay bales. In recent decades, however, synthetic fibers have come
to dom inate the international m arket. Synthetic fiber production requires m ore energy, employs fewer workers, and
leaves beh in d toxic chemical residues.
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

Workers tie sisal into bales. Cloth masks protect them from inhaling minute particles and fibers.
After defibering, sisal is sold to a “m ixer” to be softened. This process also involves m any dangers for workers, who can
claim few labor rights and rarely earn even half the m inim um wage (the equivalent of $100 a m onth in Brazil).
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

Former rubber tappers, driven out o f the rainforest by economic hardship, earn a few reais loading rubber onto a truck.
Brazil experienced its first ru b b e r boom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when E uropean factories
discovered the industrial uses o f rubber. Brazilian ru b b e r fell into decline shortly before World War I, when cheaper
goods from Malaysia flooded the m arket, bu t Allied dem and during World War II revitalized production.
Since the 1970s, Brazil’s ru b b e r tappers have attracted international attention for their efforts to protest exploitative
working conditions. According to a 1992 study by Alison Sutton— Slavery in Brazil: A Link in the Chain of Modernisation—the
owners of ru b b er plantations com m only claim exclusive rights over the sale of ru b b er produced on their lands. Sale of
ru b b er to purchasers o th er than the plantation owner is grounds for eviction. Owners also require tappers to pay ren t in
kind for the right to work on their properties, and may confiscate a w orker’s possessions in retu rn for unpaid debts.
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

A displaced rubber tapper flexes muscles acquired from lifting and stacking rubber slabs.
In the 1970s and 1980s, leaders such as Wilson Pinheiro de Souza and Chico M endes helped form labor unions and
o th er organizations to protect ru b b e r tappers; both were assassinated in the violent battle for control o f the Brazilian rain
forest. The livelihood of ru b b er tappers in the states o f Acre and Amazonas is fu rth er threatened by deforestation, tim ber
com panies and cattle ranching, which have had devastating effects on the environm ent and Brazil’s indigenous peoples.
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Although a variety o f health problems and diseases are associated with the job, charcoal workers typically lack protective gear such as
masks, boots or gloves.
Charcoal production is probably one o f the hardest and dirtiest jobs on the planet. In addition to these hazards, charcoal
workers may be cheated o f their pay by bosses who plead financial hardships o r accounting problem s. Workers in this situ
ation have few legal resources; unions advise hiring a lawyer, bu t most workers cannot even afford the bus fare into town.
Com plicating the situation fu rth er is the fact that many rural workers are illiterate, and in some cases sign docum ents they
do n o t understand.
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

The characteristic round brick ovens used in charcoal production dot an arid landscape
in Mato Grosso do Sul.
Charcoal is produced by b urning wood inside walk-in brick ovens. T he sharp
variations in tem perature inside and outside the ovens, as well as the hazards of
inhaling charcoal dust, produce a high incidence of pneum onia am ong charcoal
workers.
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Dwarfed by his burden, a worker loads charcoal onto a truck.
Charcoal production is a long, exhausting task. Adults and children alike work 12-14 h o u r days an average of six days a
week. They usually start two hours before daybreak and continue through dusk.
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

Workers arriving at a cane field in the state of Bahia. For the next six months, they will be effectively imprisoned on the plantation
through debt to its owner.
Conditions on Brazil’s sugar cane plantations are rem iniscent o f an earlier era in Latin Am erican history, when slaves and
peons labored in the fields o f the great fazendas. Nowadays, labor contractors, or gatos, recruit workers from o th er states
with prom ises of good working conditions and high wages. T he gato pays for travel expenses and food (usually bread and
soft drinks) along the way, so that the worker arrives at the plantation already in debt.
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

Harvesting sugar cane is backbreaking work. Each stalk is ait by hand with a machete.
Once workers arrive on the cane plantation, they slide deeper and deeper into
debt. They pay to sleep in filthy barracks, the only shelter available, and for the
machetes and sharpening stones used to harvest the cane.
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Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

Workers line up for the only meal of the day. The price of these meager rations is
deducted from their salaries.
The company deducts the only meal served daily from the workers’ pay. O ther
provisions, available only from the company store, are sold at inflated prices.

50 Hemisphere

•

Volume Eight, Num ber Two

Photo Essay: Contemporary "Slavery" in Brazil

The long stalks of cane are gathered into bundles and transported by truck to the mills
where they will be processed into sugar.
Indebted workers are effectively nap p ed on the plantations, since they cannot
afford the trip back home. The company provides transportation only at the end
of the cutting period, which runs from Septem ber through March. Workers leave
their identity papers at the company office, which won’t release them until all out
standing debts have been paid.
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A Capitalist Revolution?
Eduardo A. Gamarra

The Capitalist Revolution in Latin
America
by Paul Craig Roberts and
Karen LaFollette Araujo
New York: Oxford University Press,
1997. 213 pages. $25.

eoliberalism's impact
on Latin America and
the Caribbean has
been widely debated.
As this issue of
Hemisphere shows, how
ever, critics have proposed few viable
alternatives to the m arket reform s of
the past two decades. Even the left,
with a few caveats about social costs,
has accepted the basic premises of
neoliberal reform (see Andres
Oppenheimer’s commentary in this issue).
A whole library of significant case
studies and theoretical discussions
about neoliberalism is now available.
Among this vast collection, a few
works aim less to improve scholar
ship on the issue and m ore to raise
polemic and controversy. The main
objective o f such works appears to be
to rewrite Latin American history
within a simplistic framework that
gloats over the demise of the left and
blames the region’s ills on its cultur
al legacy. The best known example
is El manual del perfecto idiota latinoamericano (Barcelona: Plaza y
Janes, 1996), the Latin American
bestseller which derides the left and
obscures any negative consequences
of m arket-oriented reforms. In the

same genre is The Capitalist Revolution
in Latin America, by Paul Craig
Roberts and Karen LaFollette
Araujo.
The basic premise of this book is
that in the late twentieth century,
Latin America—guided by Chile’s
enlightened generals—woke up and
discovered capitalism. The adoption
of capitalism in the past decade
thrust Latin America into the m od
ern world, and only higher and high
er doses of neoliberalism will compel
it to abandon its “rent-seeking” past.
To achieve the final goals o f the capi
talist revolution, the authors argue,
Latin America must also undergo a
fundam ental cultural shift, abandon
ing the Catholic and Spanish her
itage responsible for the region’s
socialist/protectionist legacy. Finally,
Roberts and Araujo advocate the
elim ination o f developm ent banks,
such as the World Bank, based on
the rationale that the only financing
that should be allowed in a capitalist
global economy is the “kind that
relates to risk and reward” (p. 182).
Three ideas put forth by Roberts
and Araujo m erit further discussion:
first, the notion that Latin America is
experiencing capitalism for the first
time; second, the pervasive view that
military dictatorships were necessary
stages in the capitalist revolution;
and finally, the idea that all neoliber
al reform ers w ere/are unim peach
able revolutionaries.
D is c o v e r in g C a pita l ism

in t h e

L ate

T w e n t ie t h C e n t u r y ?

Eduardo Gamarra is editor of
Hemisphere and director of graduate
programs at the Latin American and
Caribbean Center•at Florida International
University.
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O ne of the least theoretically
sound argum ents in The Capitalist
Revolution in Latin America is the
notion that Latin America discov
ered capitalism in the late twentieth
century. According to this view, all

The

C a p ita list
R evolution
L a tin
A m erica
Paul C ra i^ R oberts Sc K a re n Lafollelte A raujo
Foreword by Peter Bauer

W ..
o f the econom ic experim ents of the
past h u n d re d years were n o t capital
ist. Instead, Latin Am erica was
characterized by the active presence
o f the state and the ubiquitous
“re n t seekers,” who behaved in pre
capitalist ways.
This argum ent ignores the fact
that capitalism has taken many dif
ferent forms and shapes around the
world. In the case of Latin America,
capitalist m arket forces have been at
work since at least the late 1800s.
T hat domestic policy makers were
unfit m anagers and that Latin
American businesses were not risk
takers is probably true, but capital
ism undeniably had a great impact
on the region well before the second
half of the twentieth century.
If capitalism only reached Latin
America in the 1970s, with the aid of
General Augusto Pinochet, then US
policy goals in the region since at
least the end o f World War II seem
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A controversial take on the origins of neoliberalism

The authors repeat the simplistic dogma that any state interven
tion is negative and that only markets driven by private sector
ingenuity urill rescue Latin America from itself They fa il to rec
ognize that the capitalist revolution itself was state-driven.
downright puzzling. Were the mili
tary-authoritarian regimes of the
1970s anticapitalist? W hat about US
policies that aim ed to prom ote
im port substitution strategies, or for
eign (and especially US) businesses
that bolstered precisely those “rent
seekers” whom the authors loathe?
Roberts and Araujo would have us
believe that any degree of state
involvement in the economy can be
equated with anticapitalism. If that
is the case, then the capitalist revolu
tion m ust also have bypassed the US
until the end of the New Deal and
the onset of the Reagan Revolution.
The authors repeat the simplistic
dogma that any state intervention is
negative, and that only markets dri
ven by private sector ingenuity will
rescue Latin America from itself.
They fail to recognize that the capi
talist revolution itself was statedriven; in many instances, the move
toward m ore open economies and
m ajor structural reforms went
against the wishes o f the private sec
tor. Even today, the private sector in
Latin America fears com petition and
often calls for a retu rn to state pro
tection. Moreover, as the current
Asian crisis shows, when neoliberal
ism or any other form of capitalist
experim ent fails, the private sector
always turns to the public sector—in
the form of state or multilateral
agencies—to bail it out. All the talk
about deregulation and m arket

forces seems superfluous at a time
when massive loans from Washington
and international financial institu
tions are bolstering neoliberal
economies in countries like Mexico
and Korea.
W er e D ic t a t o r s R f .a i .i y

that

Bad?

The last decade has seen a general
acceptance of the qualified state
m ent that General Pinochet and the
Chilean generals violated hum an
rights but left behind a successful
economic experim ent worthy of
em ulation. Most analysts on the left
and the right agree that neoliberal
ism’s principal reforms are neces
sary, but must be carried out by
dem ocratic governments. Roberts’
and Araujo’s endorsem ent of the
Pinochet m odel suggests that the
relationship between neoliberalism
and democracy is not necessarily pos
itive. After all, authoritarian regimes
do no t have to deal with unruly
labor unions or undisciplined politi
cal parties, or negotiate with a dis
ruptive legislature. In fact, in the
past decade, many countries that
adopted m arket reform s opted for
authoritarian-like decision making
mechanisms to im plem ent these
measures. Unions were busted,
union leaders jailed, and, in some
cases, states of siege im posed to con
trol dissenting voices. Lest we forget,
with the exception of Pinochet,
Latin Am erica’s military-authoritari

an experim ents were largely
responsible for the econom ic col
lapse of the 1980s.
The most objectionable aspect
of The Capitalist Revolution in Latin
America is its unqualified endorse
m ent o f General Pinochet and the
Chilean path to neoliberalism.
According to the authors: The anticapitalist left has demonized General
Augusto Pinochet, whose government
ruled Chile for almost seventeen years,
and left as its legacy a constitutional
democracy. During his reign, Pinochet
had to confront organized terrorists.
Repressions were moderate compared to
those that Castro inflicted on Cuba for
example, or that characterized political
violence in Argentina and Peru... We
believe that Pinochet ivas singled out
because he doubly sinned, adding marketization to political repression of the
left (p. 9).
Even the most recalcitrant
Chilean leftist recognizes that
neoliberal reforms in Chile were
successful and have served as a
m odel for the rest of the region.
But few, even those on the
extrem e right, would justify the
large-scale repression as a neces
sary cleansing process to eliminate
“terrorists.” Have Roberts and
Araujo forgotten that Pinochet
overthrew a constitutional dem oc
racy and carried out a systematic
pattern of repression that included
form er governm ent officials, such
as O rlando Letelier, who was m ur
dered on the streets of
Washington, D.C. by the military
regim e’s henchm en? To credit
Pinochet for the democratization
of Chile is also ludicrous. Even a
cursory survey of Chilean politics
in the late 1980s reveals that the
military regime resisted any dem o
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cratic opening. The still-restricted
nature of Chilean democracy, includ
ing built-in military prerogatives and
occasional coup threats, suggests that
the transition is far from complete.
A ll N f.o i .tbkr at. R e fo r m e r s
are

G ood

A final simplistic view furthered by
The Capitalist Revolution in Latin
America is its unqualified praise for
civilian capitalist revolutionaries.
Few would deny the m erits of the
reform program s carried out in
Carlos M enem ’s Argentina, Carlos
Salinas de G ortari’s Mexico or
Alberto Fujimori's Peru. These
reforms ended hyperinflation,
restored economic growth and
im plem ented necessary structural
adjustm ent measures. Neoliberal
ideologues, however, conveniently
gloss over the excesses of such
reforms.
Serious exam ination of the privati
zation experim ents in Argentina, for
example, reveals the extremely high
levels of corruption that character
ized the sale o f state enterprises.
Those who have studied the privati
zation process in Mexico have
reached similar conclusions. Yet,
Roberts and Araujo seem to insist
that only public sector officials who
solicit bribes are corrupt; they have
little to say about the private sector—
both foreign and domestic—that
pays up. W hen privatized industries
face turm oil, their new owners do
not hesitate to ru n to the state for
protection.
In the final analysis, The Capitalist
Revolution in Latin America, like all
good polemics, is filled with simplis
tic statements, ideological axes to
grind and unfeasible proposals.
Beyond the rhetorical appeal to
those who agree that General
Pinochet is an honorable Latin
American revolutionary, this book
provides no significant contribution
to a better understanding of the his
tory o f the region in the past
decade. ■
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Through Corridors of
Power exam ines the
influence th at insti
tutions have had
over the im plem en
tation o f policy in
A rgentina, revealing
that policies can
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military resistance.
Pion-Berlin draws
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Veoliberalism in Latin America
Marian Goslinga

eoliberalism has
El neoliberalismo hoy: debate y
b een the dom inant
realidades. Revista Economia
ideology governing
Informa (M arch 1997): 3-53.
Latin A m erican eco
[Presents various viewpoints on
nom ics, politics and
neoliberal econom ic theory and
society in the latter
practice and its effects, with a spe
p art o f the tw entieth century.
cificYet,
focus on Mexico. Includes a
as m ost sources agree, the n eoliber
selected bibliography.]
al m odel has lost su pport or, at the
very least, been subtly m odified by
Social Power and the Inflation o f
the social realities o f the hem i
Discourse: The Failure o f Popular
sphere.
H egem ony in Nicaragua. B.L.
Some o f the larger countries in
Artz. Latin American Perspectives, v.
the region, including Brazil,
24, no. 1 (January 1997): 92-113.
A rgentina and Mexico, have been
[Criticizes poststructuralism and
experim enting with th eir own
the idea o f the “en d o f ideology”
brands o f neoliberalism and have,
in the works o f E rnesto Laclau,
as the literatu re will testify, found a
C hantal M ouffe an d leading
fairly successful form ula. Smaller
N icaraguan theorists.]
countries, such as Bolivia, P eru and
Paraguay, have also developed their
Neoliberalism and Income
own versions o f neoliberal strate
Distribution in Latin America. W.
gies.
Baer, W. Maloney. World
T he following is a list o f titles
Development, v. 25, no. 3 (M arch
dealing with neoliberalism — includ
1997): 311-327. [Reviews the p rin 
ing m onographs an d periodical
cipal neoliberal policy m easures
articles— published within the last
instituted in Latin A m erica in the
few years. Many o f these works
last decade an d th eir im pact on
focus on the controversial relation
econom ic inequality.]
ship betw een neoliberalism and
democracy. Econom ic reform s
The Reconquest o f Central
have strained newly elected dem oc
America: Latin American Studies
ratic governm ents across Latin
and the Transition to Democracy,
America, severely testing the viabili
1979-1990. M.T. Berger. Latin
ty o f the neoliberal doctrine.
American Perspectives, v. 24, no. 1
A good source o f articles on this
(January 1997): 7-72. [An effort
topic is volum e 24, n u m b er 1 of
to trace the relationship betw een
Latin American Perspectives (January
the Latin A m erican Studies profes
1997), which is devoted in its
sion, U nited States hegem ony and
entirety to a discussion o f n eoliber
neoliberalism ’s resurgence in Latin
alism.
Am erica. Includes an extensive
bibliography.]
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Marian Goslinga is the Latin American
and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.

Can Neoliberalism Survive in
Latin America? G. Bird, A.
Helvege. Millennium, v. 26, no. 1
(1997): 31-56. [Investigates the

factors leading to the ad o p tio n o f
n eoliberal policies and identifies
the threats to th eir co n tin u ed
im plem entation. Predicts th at the
in teractio n betw een balance of
paym ents problem s, incom e distri
bution and econom ic growth will
create significant difficulties for
Latin A m erican econom ies over
the next few years, an d th at n eolib
eralism , if it is to survive, m ust
address key issues such as the role
o f the state.]
Nicaragua and Guyana: Conflicts
and Reforms. F.J. C arroll. Forum
for Applied Research and Public Policy,
v. 12 (Spring 1997): 79-86.
Tilting at Neoliberalism. L.
C onger. The Institutional Investor, v.
31, no. 5 (May 1997): 91-103. [A
g roup o f Latin A m erican leftists
g ath er in Mexico City in F ebruary
1996, claim ing to have a b etter
alternative to the econom ic m odel
that has d om inated the region d u r
ing the last decade.]
Neoliberalism o, dialogos y otros
temas. Jose C onsuegra Higgins.
B arranquilla, Colombia:
U niversidad Sim on Bolivar, 1996.
107 pp.
Haiti in the New World Order:
The Limits o f the Democratic
Revolution. Alex Dupuy. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1997. 220 pp.
[Includes a ch a p te r en titled , “A
N eoliberal M odel for Post-Duvalier
H aiti.”]
Shipwreck and Survival: The Left
in Central America. C. Figueroa
Ibarra. T ranslated by J o h n F.
U ggen. Latin American Perspectives,
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v. 24 (January 1997): 114-129.
[G uatem alan sociologist analyzes
th e results o f neoliberal policies on
th e C entral A m erican left.]

and influence po p u lar struggles,
given the gap betw een the elec
toral process and p o p u lar socio
econom ic interests.]

Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and
Neoliberalism in Bolivia. L. Gill.
Critique of Anthropology, v. 17, no. 3
(1997): 293-312.

The Third Wave o f Modernization
in Latin America: Cultural
Perspectives on Neoliberalism.
Lynne Phillips. W ilm ington, DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1997. [Vol.
16 in the p o p u lar series, “Jag u ar
Books on Latin A m erica.”]

Democracy and Neoliberalism in
the Developing World: Lessons
from the Anglophone Caribbean.
Clifford E. Griffin. B rookfield, VT:
Ashgate Publishing, 1997. 239 pp.
Post-1982 Effects o f Neoliberalism
on Latin American Developm ent
and Poverty: Two Conflicting
Views. H u ddle D.L. Economic
Development and Cultural Change, v.
45, no. 4 (1997): 881-897. [Review
article o f Sebastian Edwards' Crisis
and Reform in Latin America: From
Despair to Hope (New York: O xford
University Press, 1995) and
D uncan G re en ’s Silent Revolution:
The Rise of Market Economies in Latin
America (L ondon: Latin A m erican
B ureau, 1995).]
“Fujipopulism” and the Liberal
State in Peru, 1990-1995. B.H.
Kay. Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, v. 38 (W inter
1996-1997): 55-98.
Globalization and Neoliberalism:
The Caribbean Context. T hom as
Klak. Lanham , MD: Rowman &
L ittlefield, 1997.
Fast Forward: Latin America on
the Edge o f the Twenty-First
Century. Scott B. M acDonald,
G eorges A. Fauriol. New
Brunswick, NJ: T ransaction
Publishers, 1997. 318 pp.
Alternatives to Neoliberalism in
Latin America. J. Petras. Latin
American Perspectives, v. 24, no. 1
(January 1997): 80-91. [Discusses
neolib eralism ’s inability to contain
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Neoliberalism and the Sociology o f
Development: Emerging Trends
and Unanticipated Facts.
A lejandro Portes. Population and
Development Review, v. 23, no. 2
(1997): 229-259.
The Political Economy o f NeoLiberal Reform in Latin America:
A Critical Appraisal. D.G.
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